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THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND
PART III OF THE PUBLIC ORDER ORDINANCE
U
Janice Brabyn'
Part III of the Public Order Ordinance is now the main source of prior restraints
applicable to public assemblies in Hong Kong. It is also an important source of "at
the scene" control and dispersal powers. Non-compliance with the prior restraints
or disobedience of "at the scene" orders is punishable according to the criminal
provisions contained in Part III. However, since the reunification of Hong Kong
and China in 1997, some of the prior restraint provisions have been widely
disregarded. Their consistency with the fundamental freedom of peaceful assembly
demanded by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has also been
questioned. In this article, the author first sets out the fundamental freedom approach
by which it is suggested that the consistency of Part III with the ICCPR can best be
tested. Then the substance of fundamental freedom of peaceful assembly and its
significance in a democratic society is explained. Finally, using afundamental freedom
approach, the ICCPR standard for the fundamental freedom of assembly is applied
to the terms of Part Ill.
Introduction
Following their discussions concerning the first post-1997 report' on the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) under the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Human Rights Committee
(HRC) concluded:
"With regard to freedom of assembly, the Committee is aware that there
are very frequent public demonstrations in HKSAR and takes note of the
delegation's statement that permission to hold demonstrations is never
denied. Nevertheless, the Committee is concerned that the Public Order
Ordinance could be applied to restrict unduly enjoyment of the rights
guaranteed in article 21 of the Covenant."'
Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. I wish to thank my colleagues Andrew Byrnes,
Johannes Chan, Eric Cheung, Jill Cottrell, Robyn Emerton, Carole Petersen, Lyal Sunga and Benny
Tai for various research assistance and comments.
1 Initial Report (Hong Kong): China. 16 June 1999. CCPR/C/HKSAR/99/1 (State Party Report).
2 Concluding Observations on the 5th Periodic Report of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. CCPR/C/&(/Add 117.
HeinOnline -- 32 Hong Kong L.J. 271 2002
No further details were given. No changes to the Public Order Ordinance
(POO) have been made or proposed by the HKSAR Government in response.
On the contrary, in the middle of a vigorous public debate precipitated by the
August / September 2000 arrests of some students for earlier alleged offences
under Part III of the POO, the Secretary for Security sponsored a motion in
the Legislative Council endorsing the relevant POO provisions. That mo-
tion was eventually passed on 21 December 2000.'
After that, public discussion of the POO died down for a while. However,
the POO has returned to public prominence again in 2002. Early in the year,
the public learned that the Police Commissioner had imposed a general ban
on all protests in the open space in front of the Central Government Offices,
a popular demonstration venue for many protest groups. The ban was said to
be necessary in order to control the sometimes emotional protests of disap-
pointed right of abode seekers and their supporters, but other groups' protests
were also affected.'
In April, the day after a number of right of abode seekers and supporters
surrounded and detained the Secretary for Security's car outside the Legisla-
tive Council Building, about 300 police officers dispersed a long term,
authorised sit-in by a group of abode seekers and supporters in the nearby
Chater Gardens.' In May, three political activists were charged with offences
relating to organising an unauthorised assembly, in that case a public proces-
sion for which advance notice had not been given to the police as required by
the POO.6 If continued, these prosecutions will be the first of their kind
since the reunification of Hong Kong and China in 1997.
It was then noticed that the police were using large banners and placards
warning participants in some of Hong Kong's numerous unauthorised assem-
blies that they could be prosecuted.' Almost immediately, a public procession
along Nathan Road was organised to protest against the POO, protesters mak-
ing their point by taking care to ensure that their numbers stayed just within
the POO's numerical exemption from notification.9 Finally, a "June 4th" pro-
test group was successful in having the police rejection of their planned protest
Legislative Council Minutes No 13 for the meeting 20 and 21 Dec 2000, 2000 Legislative Council
Proceedings 2154-2356. Available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/english/index.htm under "Meetings",
year 2000-2001.
Ng Kang-chung, "Police chief defends confining protests", South China Morning Post (SCMP), 8
Mar 2002, p 7; Stella Lee, Jimmy Cheung, "Police chief defends ban on protesters", SCMP, 13 May
2002, p 1. Police prohibited a I May labour demonstration and a "June 4th" memorial demonstra-
tion planned for 26 May pursuant to this policy. See http://www.scmp.com.
5 Stella Lee and Shirley Lau, "Police swoop on abode seekers", SCMP, 26 Apr 2002, p 1.
6 Alex Lo, Patrick Poon and Klaudia Lee, "Landmark case launched over 'illegal protest"', SCMP, 10
May 2002, p 3.
7 The students whose arrest was noted above were not actually prosecuted.
8 Stella Lee, "Police banners heighten fears of crackdown", SCMP, 18 May 2002, p 3.
9 Felix Chan, "Street-march protesters play it by numbers", SCMP, 21 May 2002, p 4.
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in front of the Central Government Offices overturned by an Appeal Board
set up under the POO.10
Clearly the legitimacy of the Part III public assembly provisions in the
POO is still an issue for debate in the HKSAR. Equally clearly, the Secre-
tary for Security's motion cannot therefore be the HKSAR's final response
to the HRC's concerns. There are two reasons why this is so. First, domestic
and international law, and the HKSAR's own special interests, strongly
compel the adoption of a fundamental freedom" approach to the relevant
issues by all official institutions in the HKSAR. The Secretary for Security's
motion does not adopt such an approach. Second, if the restrictions im-
posed upon the expressive freedoms" by the terms of Part III of the POO
are assessed using a fundamental freedom approach, it is submitted that
significant aspects of those restrictions will be found to be inconsistent with
the ICCPR and hence with the Basic Law and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights
Ordinance 1999 (BORO).13 An in-depth discussion of the second of these
reasons is the main focus of this article, but it is first necessary to explain
the meaning of the term "fundamental freedom approach" as used in this
article and also to establish the truth of the first reason stated.
A Fundamental Freedom Approach Explained
The phrase "fundamental freedom approach" is this author's shorthand for
the approach by which, it is submitted, the compliance of Part III of the POO
with international human rights norms expressed in the ICCPR ought to be
assessed. The elements of a fundamental freedom approach may be stated in
five propositions. The first two propositions each correspond to different uses
of the word "fundamental". In legal contexts, "fundamental" is used in con-
junction with "law" to refer to the law that "determines the constitution of a
government ... and prescribes and regulates the manner of its exercise"."1
More specifically, in modern times at least, "fundamental law" means a law
1o Ambrose Leung, "Police ban on CGO rally overruled", SCMP, 22 May 2002, p 6. This was the
"June 4th" demonstration referred to in n 4 above. The police subsequently stated that applications
to use the space in front of the Central Government Offices would be reviewed on a case-by-case
basis. A "right of abode seekers" application was rejected and the rejection upheld on appeal in June
2002. See Stella Lee, "'Radical' abode seekers stopped from staging anniversary march", SCMP, 26
June 2002, p 5; Stella Lee, "Appeal over abode march rejected", SCMP, 27 June 2002, p 3.
1 "Freedom" is used throughout this article but "fundamental right approach" could have been used
just as well.
12 Used here to include the freedoms of expression, assembly, demonstration and association.
13 Enacted as s 8 of the BORO, not directly entrenched. Arts 16 and 17 of the BORO are identical to
Arts 19 and 21 of the ICCPR. For convenience, apart from direct quotes, only the ICCPR and Basic
Law provisions are referred to in this article.
14 Blacks Law Dictionary (St Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co, 6th edn, 1990), p 674. In this sense
"fundamental" is synonymous with "basic" and "constitutional". See, for example, the preamble to
the 1999 Constitution of the People's Republic of China.
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that even a democratically elected legislature may not violate on pain of
having its legislation struck down or declared void by a relevant court." Hence
the first proposition: a freedom that is guaranteed to the people of a polity in
such a way that any legislative, executive or judicial act or omission that
violates that freedom may be declared void by a relevant court is a fundamen-
tal freedom.
In ordinary usage, "fundamental" means "of or serving as a foundation or
core; of central importance". 6 Hence the second proposition: a freedom that
is an essential part of the foundation or core of, and is of central importance
to, the evolution and maintenance of a free and democratic society, is a fun-
damental freedom.
However, a fundamental freedom is not necessarily an absolute free-
dom in the sense that it will "trump" all other freedoms or interests all of
the time. The third proposition is that the character and maintenance of
a democratic society may themselves require that the exercise of a par-
ticular fundamental freedom be subject to limits or restraints. The fourth
proposition is that any limits or restraints imposed pursuant to the third
proposition must not exceed what the character and maintenance of a
democratic society necessarily require.
The fifth proposition has two related parts. When determining whether a
proposed or actual limitation on a fundamental freedom does or does not
exceed what the character and maintenance of a democratic society neces-
sarily require, a fundamental freedom approach demands (i) a profound
commitment to ensuring that the democratic core of each of the previous
four propositions is fully respected in a sensitive and principled way and (ii)
an insistence that the necessity for any proposed or imposed limitation in a
democratic society can only be established by credible empirical evidence'
and principled, rational and, where possible, authoritative argument of the
highest standard."
1 For excellent discussions of this narrower concept of "fundamental law" and the related concepts of
"judicial review" and "parliamentary supremacy" see Larry D. Kramer, "The Supreme Court 2000
Term Forward: We the Court" (2001) 115 Harvard Law Review 4 and Lord Irving of Lairg, "Sover-
eignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in Britain and America" (2001) 76 New York
University Law Review 1.
16 Concise Oxford Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 10th edn, 1999), p 573.
17 For the crucial importance of "a detailed and penetrating examination of the facts" for effective
human rights protection, see Richard Clayton, "Regaining a Sense of Proportion: The Human Rights
Act and the Proportionality Principle" (2001) 5 European Human Rights Law Review 525.
18 Note that this article does not claim that a fundamental freedom approach will enable or compel
the user to reach one single "best possible" answer or solution as to the necessity or otherwise of a
limitation on every occasion. But a fundamental freedom approach would enable a user to reach a
principled and defensible answer or solution on every occasion and the "best possible" answer or
solution, or one of a relatively narrow range of "best possible" answers or solutions, in most. In this
context, "best possible" means "the maximum extent of fundamental freedom challenged consis-
tent with the level of protection of other legitimate aims necessary in a democratic society".
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The Need for a Fundamental Freedom Approach to the Freedom of Assembly in
the HKSAR
The application of each of the first four propositions to the freedom of assem-
bly in the HKSAR is easily established.
As to the first proposition, the status of the Basic Law as a fundamental
law of the HKSAR that binds the legislature as well as the executive and the
judiciary is not in doubt.19 Article 4 of the Basic Law provides that "[tihe
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall safeguard the rights and free-
doms of the residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and
of other persons in the Region in accordance with law". Article 27, included
in that part of the Basic Law entitled "Fundamental Rights and Duties",
provides: "Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press
and of publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of procession and of
demonstration ... ". In addition, the first paragraph of Article 39 states that
the ICCPR "... as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be
implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region...". The relevant term of the ICCPR, Article 21, reads, in part, as
follows: "The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognised."
As to the second proposition, both the HRC and the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) have stated that the freedom of assembly is a funda-
mental freedom in the second sense. 20 The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal
(CFA) has begun 21 to appreciate this with respect to freedom of expression.
In HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu, 22 known as the "flag case", Chief Justice Li began
his analysis of the issues with the words:
"Freedom of expression is a fundamental freedom in a democratic society.
It lies at the heart of civil society and of Hong Kong's system and way of
life. The courts must give a generous interpretation to its constitutional
guarantee. This freedom includes the freedom to express ideas which the
majority may find disagreeable or offensive and the freedom to criticize
governmental institutions and the conduct of government officials."2
19 Art 11 expressly provides: "No law enacted by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region shall contravene this Law." See Yash Ghai, Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order:
The Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty and the Basic Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press,
2nd edn, 1999), pp 305-307.
20 See, for example, HRC decisions Gauthier v Canada (633/95), Mukong v Cameroon (458/91); ECHR
decisions Ezelin v France (1992) 14 EHRR 362, Vogt v Germany (1996) 21 EHRR 205; and the
European Commission's decision in Rassemblement Juraisseen v Switzerland (1980) 17 DR 93, p 119.
21 "Begun" because Li CJ's only reference in his judgment to the implications of the nature of a demo-
cratic society for the freedom of expression other than the quote below was to note that a number of
other democratic societies also punish desecration of national flags with imprisonment - relevant
but not of itself very profound.
22 [20001 1 HKC 117.
23 Ibid., p 135.
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There is every reason to believe that the CFA will recognise that freedom
of assembly is also "a fundamental freedom in a democratic society" when the
opportunity arises.
As to the third and fourth propositions, again, both the Basic Law and the
ICCPR are clear. Although Article 27 of the Basic Law is itself stated in
unqualified terms, the second paragraph of Article 39 provides:
"The rights and freedoms enjoyed by the Hong Kong residents shall not
be restricted unless as prescribed by law. Such restrictions shall not con-
travene the provisions of the preceding paragraph of this Article.""
Article 21 of the ICCPR further provides:
"No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than
those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety,
public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
See also Article 5(1) of the ICCPR:
"Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized
herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the
present Covenant."
As to the fifth proposition, it is submitted that the institutions of the
HKSAR should embrace it and hence embrace a fundamental freedom
approach to the expressive freedoms. There are three reasons why this
should be done. First, experience has shown that acceptance of the first
four propositions "in a general way" is typically characterised by state-
ments of principle followed by assertions of necessity or proportionality
unconnected by any or no more than cursory explanation and reasoning,
and unsupported by empirical, as distinct from anecdotal, evidence. Such
an approach leaves the doors to compromise, convenience and conven-
tion so wide open, "fundamental" and "freedom" are then constantly at
risk." Taking the obligation to justify any restrictions upon fundamental
24 That is, shall not contradict the terms of the ICCPR as it applies to the HKSAR.
25 See Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), para 18.19, p 392.
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freedoms with empirical evidence and principled, reasoned and authori-
tative argument very seriously is the only way of ensuring that the
"fundamental" part of "fundamental freedom of assembly" really means
something; that it really makes a difference.
Second, the Basic Law imposes a duty upon HKSAR institutions to develop,
nurture and protect a form of liberal democracy hitherto unknown here. This
must be done without the (immediate) safeguards of universal suffrage, strong
local government, or the assistance of established official or cultural practices /
traditions of freedom of political expression and active public participation in
government, all widely regarded as important characteristics of liberal
democracies. There is also the burden of a legislature, executive and judiciary
trained in the residual rights thinking of Hong Kong's colonial common law
past26 and the indirect influences of a vastly larger, illiberal sovereign. It is sub-
mitted that the consistent and rigorous adoption of a fundamental freedom
approach to the interpretation and implementation of the expressive freedoms
by all official HKSAR institutions would both provide a counterbalance for the
present weaknesses in the HKSAR's formal democratic structures and promote
the development of the vibrant, diverse, interconnected and publicly engaged
type of polity that best facilitates the growth and maturity of democratic insti-
tutions and democratic consciousnesses.27
Third, although the HRC's judgments are not always models of detailed
reasoning, 8 they, and the HRC's comments on state reports concerning the
expressive freedoms, do at least demonstrate a striving towards a fifth propo-
sition level of commitment to the dual fundamental character of those
freedoms, that is to the first part of the fifth proposition." Since the Basic
Law provides that the standards of the ICCPR are also to be the standards of
HKSAR law, it follows that HKSAR institutions should strive for that level
of commitment too.
26 The Hong Kong legal system incorporated the common law principle that people in Hong Kong are
free to do anything the law did not prohibit. See Peter Wesley-Smith, "Protecting Human Rights in
Hong Kong," in Raymond Wacks (ed), Human Rights in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University
Press, 1992), pp 17, 30. But subject to inapplicable colonial constraints, the relevant legislative
powers could choose to prohibit anything they choose so that the freedom of Hong Kong people to
assemble was the residue of freedom their rulers decided to leave them.
27 See Summary Record of the 1803rd Meeting of the Human Rights Committee: China, 5 Nov 1999.
CCPR/C/SR.1803 (Summary Record), para 63, per Mr Lallah: "Freedom of expression was central
to the flourishing of democracy. The law must be interpreted by the police and the administering
authorities in such a way as to further the nascent democracy in Hong Kong." Being relatively
difficult to dominate and hence relatively difficult to suppress from the outside, such a policy could
also play a significant part in safeguarding the HKSAR's prized autonomy.
28 Joseph, Schultz and Castan (n 25 above), paras 1.44-1.45, p 18. Comments on state reports may
also be short on detail, for example that made with respect to the HKSAR's POO quoted above.
29 Ibid., para 18.53, p 423, although the HRC's interpretation of Art 22 has been less encouraging:
Ibid., paras 19.22-19.24, pp 438-439. See n 109 below.
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The Secretary for Security's Motion
The terms of the Secretary for Security's motion put to the Legislative
Council in 2000 were as follows:
"That this Council considers that the POO's existing provisions relating to
the regulation of public meetings and public processions reflect a proper
balance between protecting the individual's right to freedom of expression
and right of peaceful assembly, and the broader interests of the community
at large, and that there is a need to preserve these provisions.""
The terms of the motion do not explicitly or implicitly acknowledge free-
dom of expression and assembly as having any greater status in HKSAR law
than any other right or freedom accepted by the law for the time being, for
example, the freedom to carry on lawful commerce. Nor do they point to any
standard for evaluating limitations on those freedoms other than the collec-
tive good judgement of the HKSAR Legislative Council. That is consistent
with the position at common law, but inconsistent with the proven status of
the freedoms as protected by means of a fundamental law, that is the HKSAR
Basic Law.
The use of the concept of the balance between the two freedoms and
undefined "broader interests of the community at large" to determine the
necessity of the existing POO provisions reinforces the point. Admittedly,
the use of the language of "balance" and "balancing" is common amongst
legislators, academics and jurists, even in fundamental rights contexts."
However, whilst "balancing" is unexceptional in the context of competing
freedoms of equal status, there is a real difficulty with the concept of "bal-
ancing" two potentially conflicting freedoms if one should be recognised as
more important, more fundamental, than the other. Given the objective of
achieving equilibrium inherent in the concept of balance, there is always
the danger that in the process of balancing the primacy of the fundamental
right will be lost.
Thus, during the consideration of the HKSAR's report to the HRC, one
member of the HRC, Mr Scheinin, "took particular issue with the reference
in paragraph 381(a) of the [HKSAR] report to striking a balance between
30 Legislative Council Proceedings (n 3 above), pp 2154-2155.
31 For example, Hong Kong's Lee Kwong-kut [1993] AC 951, p 966, adopted by the House of Lords in
Rv DPP ex parte Kebilene & Others [2000] 2 AC 326, p 386; [2000] HRLR 93, p 121, and Wong Yeung
Ng v S] [1999] 2 HKC 24, p 51H, per Mayo JA. The ECHR in particular uses the term frequently,
for example, Doorson v The Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330, para 70; Chassagnou and Others v
France (2000) 29 EHRR 615, para 112.
32 Andrew Ashworth, "Criminal Proceedings after the Human Rights Act: The First Year" [2001]
Crim LR 855.
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civil liberties and social order, which was not the philosophy underlying the
Covenant. The Covenant embodied rights, and any infringement of its pro-
visions must be scrupulously justified.""
It is noteworthy that the CFA avoided any talk of "balance" in Ng Kung Siu.
Of course if the concept of balance, when analysed, gives real priority
to fundamental freedom, the use of the term may not be important.' Even
so, it is submitted, the language of balance should be avoided. What is
crucial is the need to keep the dual fundamental character of the relevant
freedom prominently in mind throughout the whole process, a need the
old language of balancing can only serve to threaten or, at the very least,
obscure.
Finally, the Secretary for Security's motion characterises freedom of as-
sembly as an "individual right of assembly" in actual or potential conflict
with "broader interests of the society at large". A fundamental freedom ap-
proach would reject the "single monolithic community"" view of society
implicit in this formulation as incompatible with democratic pluralism.
Instead, it would employ a multifaceted community approach in which many
communities are seen to co-exist and interact within a society, with par-
ticular individuals typically belonging to several different communities at
any one time. It would recognise assemblies of all kinds as "intrinsically
communal" activities and "getting together", sometimes privately, some-
times in public spaces, as a vital part of community life. In addition, it would
recognise the protection of freedom of assembly for all communities as a
very valuable interest of a democratic society at large at least as broad as
any other. Finally, it would reject any limitation on a fundamental freedom
in the name of anything as vague as the "broader interests of society at
large". It would insist upon a much more precise identification of any threat-
ened social interest.
3 Summary Record of the 1805th Meeting of the Human Rights Committee (Hong Kong): China, 8
Nov 1999. CCPR/C/SR.1805, para 11: "Striking a proper balance between civil liberties and social
order" was listed in the HKSAR report as the first of three guiding principles followed by the Chief
Executive (Designate)'s Office when drafting amendments to the POO. See also Sunday Times v
United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245, pp 280-281, in which the court rejected the House of Lords'
balancing approach and said: "The Court is faced not with a choice between two conflicting prin-
ciples but with a principle of freedom of expression that is subject to a number of exceptions which
must be narrowly interpreted." Cf Aileen McHarg, "Reconciling Human Rights and the Public
Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights" (1999) 62 MLR 671, 693-694.
34 See, for example, S v Makwanyane and Another (1995) BCLR 665, p 708D-G; [1995] 3 SA 391,
p 436, per Chaskalson P of South African Constitutional Court; Duft v Communications [1996] 2
NZLR 89; Richard Clayton (n 17 above).
35 Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, "Public Protest, the Human Rights Act and Judicial Re-
sponses to Political Expression" [2000] Public Law 627, 649-650. The content of this paragraph
owes much to this article and to Eric Barendt's chapter (n 36 below).
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The Scope of the Fundamental Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
Freedom of assembly and freedom of expression
The first step in any fundamental freedom approach to the freedom of assem-
bly in the HKSAR must be an examination of the accepted scope of that
freedom under the ICCPR. 6 In the interests of brevity, the freedom of assem-
bly is here considered independently of its undoubted overlap with the
freedoms of expression, protected by Article 19 read in conjunction with
Article 20, and association, protected by Article 22. However, the fact that
these overlaps exist and will be extremely important in many cases must at
least be acknowledged. The ECHR has experienced some difficulties in de-
ciding how that overlap should be approached."7 But the drafters of the ICCPR
were adamant that freedom of assembly needed its own Article."8 Some schol-
ars have increasingly realised that the freedom does have a life and character
of its own.39 In the only reported HRC decision involving a demonstration,
both freedom of expression and freedom of assembly were separately
considered.40 It is submitted that in all public assembly cases, the possibility
of separate freedom of expression issues should be actively considered. The
expressive character of such assemblies is likely to be both one of their promi-
nent features and a compelling reason for their protection."
36 Eric Barendt, "Freedom of Assembly," in J. Beatson and Y. Cripps (eds), Freedom of Expression and
Freedom of Information - Essays in Honour of Sir David Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), p 173: "The most important general consequence of incorporation of the ECHR [into
English law via the Human Rights Act 1998] is that ... [c]ourts must now consider the scope of
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly before they determine the legality of restraints imposed
by public order (or other) legislation and the common law powers of the police to preserve the
peace." See also, Andrew S. Butler, "Interface between the Human Rights Act 1998 and other
Enactments: Pointers from New Zealand" (2000) 3 EHRLR 249, 258.
37 Barendt, ibid., pp 162-163. Cf Helen Fenwick, "The Right to Protest, the Human Rights Act and
the Margin of Appreciation" (1999) 62 MLR 491, 496-497.
38 Karl Josef Partsch, "Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms," in Louis Henkin
(ed), The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1981), pp 209, 231, although the debate apparently centred upon separating as-
sembly from association.
39 Barendt (n 36 above), pp 163-172. For recent doctrine see the ECHR decision in The Case of Refah
Partisi (Prosperity Party) and Others v Turkey Application 00041342, 31 July 2001, para 44.
40 Kivenmaa v Finland UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/412/1990, but see Therese Murphy, "Freedom of
Assembly," in Harris and Joseph (eds), The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
United Kingdom Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp 439, 444.
41 The Case of Refah Partisi (Prosperity Party) and Others v Turkey (n 39 above), para 44.
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"The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognised"
"Peaceful" in this context typically means "without violence", 42 that is, with-
out the use of unlawful43 physical force, in relation to people and property
belonging to others, and possibly also "non threatening", at least in terms of
threatening immediate violence towards specific persons or property. 14 Four
points should be noted.
First, the use of some force in politics, especially passive force directed
against governments or established / protected economic interests, is not al-
ways so clearly "wrong" or "without social utility" as the use of force in other
contexts. Admittedly, active protests, especially those that interfere with
the lawful conduct of third parties, can raise difficult competing interests and
public order issues. Even so, in the special context of politically significant /
public interest assemblies, the qualification "peaceful" should not be drawn
too widely. 6
Second, "peaceful" was intended to refer only "to the circumstances under
which the assembly is held ... [not] the object for which the assembly is called
or to the opinions which may be expressed on that occasion".4 1
Third, a participant in an assembly whose conduct and intentions are at
all relevant times peaceful remains within the freedom of assembly, notwith-
standing the violent conduct or intentions of other participants in the same
assembly" or participants in a counter-assembly or hostile audience. 49
Fourth, a peaceful assembly is entitled to Article 21 protection, notwith-
standing that it is said to be unlawful by some domestic law, at least where the
sole basis for the characterisation is a failure to notify relevant authorities as
required or some similar reason.50
42 Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl: NP Engel,
1993), p 375.
43 That is, force used other than within the recognised boundaries of self defence, crime prevention or
necessity.
4 Partsch (n 38 above), p 233 and Nowak (n 42 above), p 374 refer to the expression "without uproar,
disturbance, or the use of arms" used by a delegate during the drafting process.
4 See Helen Fenwick (n 37 above), pp 494-495 and 497 for an interesting classification of types of
protest and their implications.
46 G v Federal Republic of Germany (1989) 60 DR 256, p 263. Compare the conclusions of the ECHR
in Steele v United Kingdom (1999) 28 EHRR 603 with the reasoning and conclusions of the German
Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) in Bundesgerichtshof (Sixth Civil Senate) 4 Nov 1997,
1998 NJW 377 available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla.html, the German Law Archive maintained
by the University of Oxford, Institute of European and Comparative Law.
4 Partsch (n 38 above), p 231.
48 Ezelin v France (1992) 14 EHRR 362, Christians against Racism and Facism v United Kingdom (1980)
21 DR 138, 148.
49 See Nowak (n 42 above), pp 375-376, also Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben' v Austria (1991) 13
EHRR 204, para 32; Christians against Racisim and Facism v United Kingdom, ibid. This accords with
some 19th century and recent English precedents concerning breach of the peace discussed below,
see Beatty v Gillbanks (1882) 9 QBD 308; Redmond-Bate v DPP (1999) 163 JP 789; [1999] Crim LR
998; and dictim of Bokhary JA in R v To Kwan Hang [1994] 2 HKC 293, p 307F-H.
50 G v Federal Republic of Germany (n 46 above).
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As to "assembly", the Basic Law refers to "freedom ... of assembly, of pro-
cession and of demonstration". The ICCPR uses the single word "assembly",
but there is no doubt that this includes processions and demonstrations. It is
the intentional joining together for a common purpose of at least two persons
for a limited duration that is the essence of an assembly, not its form."
The phrase "shall be recognised" could be read as imposing a lesser obliga-
tion on a state than the more common "shall have the right", but commentators
have suggested that it is unlikely any difference was intended.5
Positive obligations: access to public space
All assemblies need physical space. Access to that space can be a serious
practical impediment to the effective enjoyment of freedom of assembly. Large,
affordable, enclosed venues and strategically located open air spaces in par-
ticular are likely to be in relatively short supply and much sought-after.
Coexistence with other activities might not always be possible. The exclu-
sionary rights of private landowners and the similar rights claimed for some
types of public ownership may cause additional problems."
It is submitted that a fundamental freedom approach to freedom of assem-
bly would mean taking the resource implications of assemblies seriously. As a
barest minimum this must mean that those with authority over public spaces,
whether enclosed or open air, cannot be permitted to prohibit all public as-
sembly activity or subject all public assemblies therein to a content-sensitive
permit system as if they were private owners." There are strong arguments for
going further and imposing a positive obligation on governments to open up
public spaces specifically for assemblies and to facilitate reasonable use of
other public spaces such as parks, open spaces strategically proximate to
politically, socially or economically significant buildings or structures, roads
51 Kivenmaa v Finland (n 40 above), per dissent of Mr Kurt Herndl, para 2.6. The majority offered no
alternative meaning. Nowak (n 42 above), pp 373-374, quoted with apparent approval in Joseph,
Schultz and Caston (n 25 above), para 19.02, p 426, has suggested that Art 21 is "specifically di-
rected at assemblies concerned with the discussion or proclamation of information and ideas". The
ECHR reached a similar conclusion in Anderson v United Kingdom [1998] EHRLR 218, but see
comment in Ben Emmerson QC and Andrew Ashworth QC, Human Rights and Criminal Justice
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), para 8-75, p 253.
52 Partsch (n 38 above), pp 231-232; Nowak (n 42 above), pp 372-373.
5 Francesca Klug, Keir Starmer and Stuart Weir, The Three Pillars of Liberty: Political Rights and Free-
doms in the United Kingdom (London: Routledge, 1996), pp 188-193 graphically illustrate the
consequences of private and public controls on space for the real as distinct from the theoretical
freedom of assembly. See also Therese Murphy (n 40 above), pp 445-448.
5 Nowak relates this to obligations not to discriminate on the grounds of political or other opinion
(n 42 above), pp 382-383.
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and footpaths." The opening up of privately owned spaces that serve quasi-
public purposes, such as shopping malls and housing estates, also requires
sensitive consideration.5
None of the international institutions mentioned in this article has yet
addressed these points directly."
Positive obligations: protection from hostile audiences
Nowak records that the drafters of Article 21 of the ICCPR specifically envisaged
a positive state obligation to protect members of assemblies from outside
interference." The European Commission and the ECHR have interpreted Ar-
ticle 11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms as imposing positive government obligations to protect
people exercising their freedom of assembly from intimidation, disruption or physi-
cal attacks by others. In Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben", the Commission said:
"[Tihe Convention does not merely oblige the authorities of the Contracting
States to respect for their own part the rights and freedoms embodied in it, but
in addition it requires them to secure the enjoyment of these rights and free-
doms by preventing and remedying any breach thereof... Also, the Convention
is intended to guarantee rights that are practical and effective and not rights
that are theoretical or illusory ... The obligation to secure the effective exer-
cise of Convention rights may therefore involve positive obligations on the
State in a number of areas ... Accordingly, in the Commission's view, the
right to freedom of assembly as guaranteed by Article 11 para 1 must include
the right to protection against counter-demonstrators, because it is only in
this way that its effective exercise can be secured to social groups wishing to
demonstrate for certain principles in highly controversial issues."59
55 For a limited recognition of a common law right of assembly with respect to public highways, see
DPP vJones [19991 2 AC 240, discussed at length in Fenwick and Phillipson (n 35 above). The US
constitutional theory of the public forum could be a useful starting point for a wider viewpoint. See
Hague v CIO (1939) 307 US 496; 59 S Ct 954; Perry Education Association v Perry Local Educators'
Association (1983) 460 US 37; 103 S Ct 948; and Barendt (n 36 above), pp 169-172. Note also
Barendt's reference to the German constitutional position at p 171.
56 Nowak (n 42 above), p 3 8 3 , suggests a very narrow obligation. The English Court of Appeal gave
almost absolute rights to property owners in CIN Properties Ltd v Rawlins and others [1995] 2 EGLR
130, CA, discussed in K. Gray and S. F. Gray, "Civil Rights, Civil Wrongs and Quasi-Public Space"
[1999] 1 EHRLR 46, 47-49. The US courts are inconsistent, see Stanley H. Friedelbaum, "Private
Property, Public Property: Shopping Centers and Expressive Freedom in the States" (1999) 62 Al-
bany Law Review 1229; Jennifer Niles Coffin, "The United Mall of America: Free Speech, State
Constitutions, and the Growing Fortress of Private Property" (2000) 33 University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform 615. For related Canadian views see K Mart Canada Ltd v U.F.C.W. Local 1518
(1999) 99 Canadian Labour Law Cases 220, S Ct of Canada.
5 Mark Anderson v United Kingdom [1998] EHRLR 218 could have been decided on this ground, but
was not.
5 Nowak (n 42 above), p 376.
59 Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben" v Austria (1985) 44 DR 65, pp 72-73. For the ECHR decision see
(1991) 13 EHRR 204, para 32.
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Of course, this does iot impose an absolute obligation on a state to com-
mit all possible resources or even to adopt the single most effective course to
protect people taking part in assemblies. It does mean that restricting a peaceful
demonstration can only be justified "if disorder arising as a consequence of
violent counter-demonstrations cannot be prevented by other less stringent
measures". It also means that the right to the taking of those less stringent
measures is a part of the substantive right.60
Legitimate Restrictions on the Freedom of Assembly
The burden of proof
Once a complainant has established the official restriction of a fundamental
freedom as a live issue, it is for the government to prove either "no restric-
tion" in fact or the legitimacy of any admitted restriction.61 The CFA has
already accepted this point.62 This is so even where the issue is raised in the
context of an application for judicial review.63 The importance of this alloca-
tion of the burden of proof for a fundamental freedom approach cannot be
overstated and so it is mentioned first.
"No restrictions ... other than those imposed in conformity with the law"
Hong Kong courts have implicitly accepted the ECHR's interpretation of the
phrase "prescribed by law" in Article 10 of the ECHR in Sunday Times v United
Kingdom as an appropriate interpretation of the words "provided by the law"
in Article 19 of the ICCPR:64
"In the Court's opinion, the following are two of the requirements that flow
from the expression 'prescribed by law'. First, the law must be adequately
accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in
the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a
norm cannot be regarded as a 'law' unless it is formulated with sufficient
precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if
need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable
in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.""
60 Ibid.
61 For an exceptional discussion of evidence and burden of proof issues, see Emmerson and Ashworth
(n 51 above), paras 1-117 to 1-125, pp 43-45.
62 Ng Kung Siu (n 22 above), p 136H.
63 Richard Gordon QC and Tim Ward, Judicial Review and the Human Rights Act (London: Cavendish
Publishing Limited, 2000), para 3.146, p 82.
64 AG v Cheung Kim Hung (1997) 7 HKPLR 295, p 303, per Rogers J, adopted in Wong Yeung Ng v
Secretary for Justice [1999] 2 HKC 24, pp 52-53.
65 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (n 33 above), p 271.
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However, some commentators have suggested that "in conformity with
the law" implies a lesser standard than "provided by law", perhaps permitting
more administrative discretion when imposing limits on the rights. Partsch
describes "in accordance with the law" as a less strict form, "doubtless in order
to allow wider discretion to administrative authorities acting under general
authorisation. Presumably, the police may act on the basis of a general clause
authorising them to act in the interest of public safety".66 But it is always the
objective "to avoid arbitrary restrictions on rights by requiring that the limi-
tation be established by a general rule"." The detailed rules controlling the
exercise of the discretion might be contained in a document not having the
status of a law, such as Police General Orders perhaps,68 at least if the de-
tailed rules are nevertheless generally applied.69
"Necessary in a democratic society": the nature of a democratic society
Kiss records both that (i) the words "in a democratic society"" in Article 21
were insisted upon by some who expressed the opinion that "freedom of as-
sembly could not be effectively protected unless the limitation clause was
applied according to the principles recognized in a democratic society" and
(ii) the drafters were unable to agree upon a definition of the term.7 But the
concept is so central to the whole notion of a fundamental freedom approach
that some attempt to analyse it must be made. For this purpose, it is submitted,
it should be sufficient to note some minimal characteristics about which there
can be no good faith debate. More detailed analysis can be left to the HKSAR
institutions as the need arises.
66 Note 38 above, p 232. See also Nowak (n 42 above), pp 377-378; Joseph, Schultz and Castan (n 25
above), pp 426-427; and Therese Murphy (n 40 above), p 443. Cf A. H. Robertson and J. G.
Merrills, Human Rights in Europe: A study of the European Convention on Human Rights (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 3rd edn, 1993), p 196 taking a contrary position with respect to a
similar diverse collection of expressions in the European Convention.
67 Alexandre Kiss, "Permissible Limitations on Rights," in Louis Henkin (ed), The International Bill of
Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York: Columbia U Press, 1981), pp 290, 304.
68 Assuming the orders are binding directives and are truly accessible to the public.
69 Silver v United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 347, para 33. But Home Office guidelines, neither legally
binding nor directly accessible to the public, were not sufficient for the ECHR in Khan (Sultan) v
United Kingdom [2000] Crim LR 684; 8 BHRC 310 or Govell v UK [1998] EHRLR 438 cited therein.
For an extremely lax decision on this point, see Rai, Allmond and "Negotiate Now" 19 EHRR CD 93,
p 9 7 . See generally Emmerson and Ashworth (n 51 above), paras 2-80 to 2-91, pp 86-90; Richard
Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000),
paras 6.126-6.143, pp 322-330.
70 Through the incorporation of the ICCPR into HKSAR law, the HKSAR has accepted the stan-
dards of democratic societies as the yardstick by which to measure permissible limits on the expressive
freedoms irrespective of whether the HKSAR is or is not a democratic society itself.
71 Alexandre Kiss (n 67 above), p 305f. See also Partsch (n 38 above), p 232 and Nowak (n 42 above),
pp 378-379.
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A common beginning for such an analysis in recent years has been all or
part of the following extract from the ECHR's judgment in Handyside v the
United Kingdom:
"The Court's supervisory functions oblige it to pay the utmost attention to
the principles characterizing a 'democratic society'. Freedom of expression
constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a society, one of the
basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. Sub-
ject to Article 10(2), it is applicable not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that
are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference,
but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the
population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and
broadmindedness without which there is no 'democratic society'."72
The ECHR has recently reiterated its view that pluralism is central to a
democratic society.7' The same must be true of tolerance and broadmindedness.
Accrediting members of a specific society with these democratic attitudes should
have important consequences for a fundamental freedom approach to disrup-
tions caused to one part of the society by the assembly activities of another part
in particular, and to the tolerance of difference in general.71 But democracy is
not only about attitudes and values. It is also about a form of governance, the
three being closely interrelated. Hence to the Handyside characteristics must be
added (i) formal and informal public participation as of right in the processes
and decision making of government,7 1 and, at least in the context of the ICCPR,
(ii) real limitations on the power of the institutions of government to restrict
such participation or to impinge on other fundamental rights and (iii) real limi-
tations on the power of others to infringe the fundamental rights of individuals,
whether as individuals or as members of a minority. 6 Of course, there is room
for substantial diversity in implementation, but not to the point where the core
of any of these three characteristics is lost.
72 [1976] 1 EHRR 737, para 49, p 754. Nowak (n 42 above), p 379 suggests the "minimum democratic
standard" may be lower in a "universal international treaty than in a regional one", but that the
criteria in Handyside "may be deemed valid as a general standard for democratic societies".
7 United Communist Party of Turkey v Turkey (1998) 26 EHRR 121, para 43.
7 Fenwick and Phillipson (n 35 above), pp 649-650.
7 See Art 26 of the Basic Law, which protects formal participation in elections, and the wider Art 25
of the ICCPR, which protects the right to participate in public life. The UK initially entered a
reservation to Art 25 to the effect that Art 25 "does not require the establishment of an elected
Executive or Legislative Council in Hong Kong". See s 13 of the BORO. However, election of the
Chief Executive and the Legislative Council by universal adult suffrage, at least by 2008, are stated
objectives of the Basic Law, Arts 45 and 68 respectively.
76 See Kiss (n 67 above), pp 307-309; Nowak (n 42 above), p 3 79 . For discussion of the rather narrow
ECHR models of democracy, see Susan Marks, "The European Convention on Human Rights and
its 'Democratic Society' (1995) 66 The British Year Book of International Law 209; A. Mowbray,
"The Role of the European Court in the Promotion of Democracy" [1999] Public Law 703.
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"Necessary in a democratic society": the functions of the freedom of assembly
in a democratic society
A fundamental freedom approach to freedom of assembly requires a sensitive
appreciation of the functions of that freedom in a democratic society that
may be adversely affected by any actual or proposed limitation. Much has
been written about the functions of freedom of assembly in recent times."
The functions include all the functions of freedom of expression commonly
referred to in US texts as "the argument from truth", "the marketplace of
ideas", "the checking of government" and "self fulfilment"."" But freedom of
assembly is more than simply one possible mode of expression: it has its own
additional functions.
Popular participation in the processes of government at all levels is of the
essence in democracy as a form of government. Barendt points to the historical
connections between public assemblies and the ancient rights of petition, 79
and concludes that even today, "meetings and demonstrations ... amount to
an active engagement in the life of the community "." It is a participation
potentially supplementary to, or quite separate from, the formal ballot box,
and within or outside the constraints of political parties or any form of organised
politics. Public assemblies enable people who feel strongly to express and dem-
onstrate the depth of their feelings to themselves and others, perhaps
discovering the empowering experience of realising they are not alone, per-
haps just letting off steam. They are relatively cheap, accessible and perhaps
uniquely effective at getting a target audiences' attention, always a prerequi-
site for communication. As such they are particularly suited to minorities and
relatively economically, socially or politically disadvantaged majorities. These
are the groups most often at risk of being deliberately, or for lack of money /
expertise / contacts or willingness / ability to conform to dominant rules of
the organised political game, excluded from, or misrepresented and distorted
by, other modem means of mass communication. Public assemblies can also
be a useful wake up call, alerting non-participants to the problems of those
whose lives do not directly touch theirs, or to some consequences of choices
or administrative action not otherwise seen.
Freedom of assembly also protects private assemblies, politically sig-
nificant or otherwise."1 These are normally left out of the discussion, but must
be mentioned here because the terms of the POO would include some of
n Fenwick (n 37 above), pp 492-494; Barendt (n 36 above), pp 165-169.
78 For example, Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and
Procedure (St Paul, Minnesota: West Group, 3rd edn, 2000), pp 252-256.
79 Note 36 above, p 167.
80 Ibid., p 168.
81 See n 51 above for arguments to the contrary.
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them. The political, social and personal significance of such assemblies in
any society cannot be over-estimated.82
"Necessary in a democratic society": necessary and proportional
The HRC," the European institutions" and the CFA" have all accepted
that determining what is "necessary" imports a requirement of proportionality,
although the HRC often does not use the term "proportionality" specifically.
The Privy Council recently approved an approach that treats proportionality
as the wider term." Whatever terminology is used, in every case it must be
determined, taking account of the particular circumstances of the relevant
society and the facts of any actual incident, but always applying the measure
of a democratic society, (i) whether there was a need to limit the fundamen-
tal freedom of assembly to some degree in order to achieve a specific permissible
objective and (ii) if there was such a need, whether what was done or pro-
posed was not more than was required to'achieve that specific objective. The
first question may conveniently be expressed in terms of necessity, the sec-
ond in terms of proportionality, but terminology is not crucial. What is crucial
is that the factual and normative components of each issue are rigorously and
not merely superficially probed.
As to the meaning of necessity, the Hong Kong courts have "gone it alone".
In Handyside, the ECHR said, "whilst the adjective 'necessary' ... is not syn-
onymous with 'indispensable' [here the court contrasted the use of the phrases
'absolutely necessary' and 'strictly necessary' in Articles 2(2) and 6(1)
respectively] neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as 'admissible',
'ordinary', 'useful', 'reasonable' or 'desirable"'." The court then added:
"Nevertheless, it is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment
of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion of 'necessity' in
this context."8 This seems unexceptional. It is difficult to see how an inter-
ference with a fundamental right could be necessary, as distinct from merely
useful, reasonable or desirable, in a democratic society if it was only required
for the purpose of achieving a not really pressing or important social need.
82 For a strong argument as to the individual apolitical importance of the expressive freedoms see Sir
John Laws, "Meiklejohn, the First Amendment, and Free Speech in English Law," in Ian Loveland
(ed), Importing the First Amendment: Freedom of Expression in American, English and European Law
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), p 123.
83 Faurisson v France 550/93 cited in Joseph, Schultz and Caston (n 25 above), para 18.18, p 392.
84 Authorities are legion, beginning with Handyside (n 72 above), para 49, p 754. Note that the ECHR's
application of proportionality is greatly influenced by its doctrine of a margin of appreciation: Fenwick
and Phillipson (n 35 above), pp 641-643; Aileen McHarg (n 33 above), pp 687-688.
85 Ng Kung Siu (n 21 above), p 140G.
86 De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1
AC 69, 80 per Lord Clyde. Lord Steyn adopted the approach in de Freitas, though only in a general
way, in R vA (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 45, p 65F-H. The passage has been cited in many recent cases.
8 Note 72 above, para 48, p 754.
88 Ibid.
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The Hong Kong courts have not yet cited the first part of the Handyside dis-
cussion of necessity, but they have consistently refused to embrace what they
have interpreted as the substitution of "necessary" by the phrase "pressing social
need" in the second part, labelling the phrase "unhelpful". Instead, they have
insisted that "necessary" must be given its ordinary meaning, but without
explaining the normal meaning.89 The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines
"necessary", when used as an adjective, as "required to be done, achieved, or
present; needed"." Provided the full import of this meaning of the word is rigor-
ously maintained, no harm will come from the departure from Handyside,
particularly if the court takes the trouble to explain precisely why restriction of
the freedom of assembly was necessary in a particular case.91
As to proportionality, the court in Handyside explained that the concept
of a democratic society meant "amongst other things, that every 'formality',
'condition', 'restriction' or 'penalty' imposed in this sphere [the sphere of free-
dom of expression and, it is submitted, of freedom of assembly as well] must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued".92
Again it is essential to realise that a low level of scrutiny of this issue could
permit the fundamental freedom of assembly to be "proportionalised" away.
A fundamental freedom approach would not allow that. In this context it is
highly significant that the House of Lords has recently concluded:
"There is a material difference between the Wednesbury and Smith grounds of
review [of administrative action] and the approach of proportionality appli-
cable in respect of review where [European] convention rights are at stake ...
The starting point is that there is an overlap between the traditional grounds
of review and the approach of proportionality ... But the intensity of review is
somewhat greater under the proportionality approach ... First, the doctrine of
proportionality may require the reviewing court to assess the balance which
the decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of
rational or reasonable grounds. Secondly, the proportionality test may go fur-
ther than the traditional grounds of review inasmuch as it may require attention
to be directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations.
Thirdly, even the heightened test developed in R v Ministry of Defence, ex p.
Smith is not necessarily appropriate to the protection of human rights ... This
89 Ng Kung Siu (n 22 above), p 140C-D and cases cited therein.
90 Note 96 above, p 953.
91 It is crucial that Lord Jauncy of Tullichettle's reliance on James v United Kingdom [1986] 8 EHRR
123 in Ming Pau Newspapers Ltd and Others v AG of HK [1996] 2 HKLR 239 is not repeated. James
was a Protocol 1, Art 1 case which even the Commission recognised does not involve a necessity
test at all, but rather contemplates a much larger margin of appreciation to the states than Arts 8-
11(2) could tolerate, together with a mere reasonableness standard. See Howard Charles Yourow,
The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), p 149 at n 378.
92 Note 72 above, para 49, p 754.
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does not mean that there has been a shift to merits review. On the contrary,
and Professor Jowell has pointed out the respective roles of judges and admin-
istrators are fundamentally distinct and will remain so.""
Here mention must be made of the European notion of "margin of appre-
ciation"94 and the more familiar common law "deference to the legislature".
As to the former, it is submitted that the European doctrine of a "margin of
appreciation" should have no place in Hong Kong domestic jurisprudence.
The HRC has rejected the margin of appreciation approach, even as between
different states.95 The House of Lords has stated that the doctrine has no place
in domestic courts." The CFA made no mention of the "margin of apprecia-
tion" in the flag case judgments. It is submitted that references to the doctrine
by the Privy Council in Ming Pao" were misleading and misplaced. Actual
decisions of the European institutions which refer to the doctrine must there-
fore be approached with care. They may mislead local courts into adopting
too low a level of scrutiny.98
Judges trained in a tradition of parliamentary supremacy must also treat
the concept of "deference to the legislature" with care. Where questions as to
the compatibility between the ICCPR and the common law or judicial
sentences arise, the courts as primary decision makers need defer to no one.
Where legislative or executive action is to be reviewed, the position may be
otherwise. In Ng Kung Siu, Liu CJ said that "due weight" should be given to
the views of the National People's Congress and Legislative Council as to the
appropriateness of enacting the "flag protection" legislation in question.99
Bokhary PJ said, "When a matter of the present kind comes before the courts,
the question is not which approach the judges personally prefer. It is whether
the approach chosen by the legislature is one permitted by the constitution.
93 R (Daly) v Home Secretary [2001] 2 WLR 1622, pp 1634-1636. References for texts within the quote
are Rv Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517, p 554 and Professor Jeffrey Jowell QC,
"Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review" [2000] PL 671, 681. See also
Richard Clayton (n 17 above).
94 The doctrine whereby a "state is permitted a certain measure of discretion, subject to supervision by
the competent international monitoring body, when it takes legislative, administrative, or judicial
action in the area of a guaranteed right". David Harris, "The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the United Kingdom: An Introduction," in Harris and Joseph (eds), The Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and United Kingdom Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1995), pp 1, 13.
95 Harris and Joseph, ibid., pp 13-14; Joseph, Schultz and Castan (n 25 above), para 18.21; and n 27
above, p 394 and paras 1.65-1.73, pp 24-28, re cultural and economic relativism.
96 See R v DPP, ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326, p 380E, dictum of Lord Hope of Craighead. Cf use
of the phrase in R v Chief Constable of Sussex, ex parte International Ferry Traders Ltd [1999] 1 All ER
129, pp 137, 157, per Lords Slynn and Cooke respectively, when reviewing and deferring to the
expertise of a Chief Constable seeking a ban on processions from a local authority.
97 [1996] 2 HKLR 239, pp 244-246.
98 Emmerson and Ashworth (n 51 above), pp 103-104. See Fenwick, "The Right to Protest" (n 37
above), pp 500-505 as to approaches local courts could take to ECHR cases affected by the margin
of appreciation factor.
99 Note 22 above, p 140D-E.
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This does not involve deference to the legislature. It is simply a matter of
maintaining the separation of powers.""'
However, it is essential to a fundamental freedom approach that the
judiciary not be intimidated by "the counter-majoritarian argument" in its
defence of fundamental freedoms against encroachment by the legislature or
the executive. The expressive freedoms in particular are intimately involved
in preserving the democratic nature of the political process itself. The judges,
steeped in the values of the rule of law and relatively immune from crass
political influence, are the Basic Law's "last stop" guardians of the democratic
character of that political process, and the minimal rights of the losers within
and without it. It is an awesome responsibility that should not be surrendered
lightly.' A weak judiciary is as much a threat to the separation of powers as
an overactive one.
"Necessary in a democratic society": content neutrality
Acceptance of the above analyses of the burden of proof, the nature of demo-
cratic society, the functions of freedom of assembly in such a society and the
restrictive term "necessity" has important consequences in a fundamental free-
dom approach for the legitimacy of limitations on the fundamental freedom
of assembly based on content or in the form of prior restraints.
Given the pluralist and tolerant character of a democratic society, and the
function of assemblies as a means of participation in public life, restrictions
on freedom of assembly expressly or implicitly related to the content (eg the
purpose, personnel or message) of the assembly can rarely be justified as nec-
essary in a democratic society to achieve any legitimate aim. However, such
restrictions are attractive to legislators, executive officers, administrators and
peace keepers wishing to inhibit or prevent expression of a particular point of
view or by the members of a particular community. Therefore, a fundamental
freedom approach would require all overtly content related restrictions, re-
strictions that facilitate the making of content related decisions and even
disparate impact provisions, to be scrutinised very carefully.
That does not mean, however, that all content related restrictions would be
rejected.'" Both the HRC and the ECHR have accepted significant
restrictions on the expressive freedoms relating to obscene material, defamation
10 Ibid., p 147E-G. See also R v DPP ex parte Kebilene (n 31 above), p 381 wherein Lord Hope of
Craighead observed that it would be easier to recognise an area of judgment within which the
judiciary should defer on democratic grounds "... where the issues involve questions of social policy
or economic policy, much less so where the rights are of high constitutional importance
101 RJR-McDonald v Canada (Attorney-General) [1993] 3 SCR 199, paras 133-137, cited in Clayton,
"Regaining a Sense of Proportion" (n 17 above), pp 520-521.
102 See generally, David Feldman, "Content Neutrality," in Ian Loveland (ed), Importing the First
Amendment: Freedom of Expression in American, English and European Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
1998), p 138.
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of private individuals and judges, national security, reckless incitement of immi-
nent violence, inciting the abolition of institutions of democracy' 03 and racial or
religious invective. "I In order to ensure the maintenance of public order (ordre
public), restrictions in the last four categories might be necessary in the context of
public assemblies, notwithstanding that restriction of the same content in pub-
lished material only would not be justifiable.
"Necessary in a democratic society": prior restraints
Types of prior restraints or pre-emptive strikes include court injunctions and
official notificationics or permitl06 requirements, condition-imposing powers
and prohibition or banning powers. Many societies use some or all of these
types in a variety of mixes. Their purpose is to facilitate the shutting of the
stable door before any undesired expressive activity can bolt, that is before
the expressive activity gets any chance to be seen or heard. Fear of the pros-
pect of subsequent punishment would have to exceed the organisers /
participants desire for the expressive activity to take place according to their
plans before a subsequent punishment provision alone could suppress the ac-
tivity as effectively as an efficient prior restraint. But this is precisely why
prior restraints must be seen as an exceptional threat to the expressive freedoms.
The need for the users of prior restraints to make predictions about the public
order or public safety consequences of proposed expressive activities also
increases the risk of unnecessarily impeding, limiting or preventing such ac-
tivity due to excessively cautious public order decisions. In addition, the
discretion built into most prior restraints facilitates illegitimate content
103 See ICCPR, Art 5; European Convention, Art 17; and Jochen Abr. Frowein, "Incitement Against
Democracy as a Limitation of Freedom of Speech," in David Kretzmer and Francine Kershman
Hazan (eds), Freedom of Speech and Incitement Against Democracy (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 2000), p 33.
104 See ICCPR, Art 20. The United Kingdom's reservation concerning this term applied in Hong Kong.
No equivalent term appears in the BORO. But see the HRC's ICCPR General Comment 24 con-
cerning Issues Relating to Reservations made upon ratification of accession to the Covenant or the
Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under Art 41 of the Covenant in which it
is suggested there is an obligation to punish racial hate speech under customary international law.
See also JRT and the WG Party v Canada 104/81 and Faurisson v France 550/93 in Joseph, Schulz and
Caston (n 25 above), paras 18.47, 18.48, pp 415-423, both decided under Art 19, though Art 20
was referred to; Felderer v Sweden (1986) 8 EHRR 91, p 92, decided on Art 10 principles alone.
Offences punishing "insulting" behaviour could be used here, for example, POO, s 17B.
105 That is, a duty to provide information only, with or without penalties for failure to do so, but
without rendering the unnotified assembly unlawful for that reason alone, as with the Public Order
Act 1986, s 11 relating to processions in England. See John Marston and Paul Thain, Public Order
Offences (London: FT Law & Tax, 1995), p 112 and Richard Card, Public Order Law (Bristol: Jordon
Publishing Limited, 2000), para 6.7, pp 212-213.
106 That is, any system by which assemblies are unlawful unless permission to hold them has been given
by a relevant public authority. New York City's Administrative Code, Title 10, para 10 may fall into
this category, but the constitutional status of the provision is in doubt: McDonald v Safir 206 F 3d
183 (2d Cir 2000). A system whereby failure to notify makes the assembly itself unlawful would sit
uncomfortably in between.
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censorship. Alternatively, resort to prior restraints that are content neutral
because universally applied typically burdens, distorts or prevents a great deal
of expressive activity outside the mischief of the ban. Finally, prior restraints
often have the practical effect of forcing would-be protestors to choose be-
tween the "taming and institutionalising" of their expressive activity or civil
disobedience."o' A fundamental freedom approach would therefore require
the form and impact of all prior restraints to be scrutinised with special care.
If prior restraints are treated with suspicion so too must significant penal-
ties for violations of those restraints, again because of their chilling effects.
In Kivenmaa, the HRC commented that "a requirement to notify police of
an intended demonstration in a public place six hours before its commence-
ment may be compatible with the permitted limitations laid down in article
21 of the Covenant".' However, the HRC nevertheless found for the
applicant. One commentator has suggested that "the majority decision may
be rationalized as a condemnation, albeit poorly executed, of blanket advance
notice requirements for public meetings".'09 A number of criticisms of such
"blanket" notice requirements in various of the HRC's concluding comments
were cited in support.110 These and other comments suggest the HRC would
fairly readily accept narrowly drawn notice requirements for open air
assemblies, at least assemblies of a significant size, but would need convincing
107 Barendt (n 36 above), p 176.
1os Note 40 above, para 9.2.
109 Joseph, Schulz and Castan (n 25 above), para 19.10, p 432.
110 Concluding Comments on Mauritius (1996) UN doc CCPR/C/79/Add 60, para 28 read in the light
of CCPR/C/SR.1477, paras 39, 49, 53, 69 and CCPR/C/SR/1478, paras 20, 28, disapproving of a
law requiring seven days notice and permission from the Commissioner of Police for any public
meeting; Concluding Comments on Belarus (1997), UN doc CCPR/C/79/Add 86, para 24, declar-
ing incompatible with Art 21 a permit requirement with a 15 day minimum application period for
demonstrations; Concluding Comments on Morocco (1999) UN doc CCPR/C/79/Add 113, para
24, expressing concern about "the breadth of the requirement of notification for assemblies and that
the requirement of a receipt of notification of an assembly is often abused, resulting in de facto
limits of the right of assembly" and concluding that the "requirement of notification should be
restricted to outdoor assemblies and procedures adopted to ensure the issue of a receipt in all cases".
See also Concluding Observations of the HRC: United Republic of Tanzania CCPR/C/79/Add 12,
para 11, recommending that the United Republic of Tanzania take steps "to guarantee freedom of
assembly without the requirement for pre-permission or such other restrictions as may jeopardize
the freedom in question without necessarily being a threat to public order"; Concluding Comments
on the Netherlands re Netherlands Antilles CCPR/CO/72/Net, para 20, regretting that "the legal
rules on the right of peaceful assembly [in the Netherlands Antilles] contain a general requirement
of prior permission from the local police chief"; Concluding Comments on Cyprus CCPR/C/79/
Add 88, para 15, and see CCPR/C/94/Add 1, paras 241-244, expressing concern about the condi-
tions which appropriate authorities may impose on the conduct of assemblies and processions in
Cyprus and noting that the advance notice to be given was too early and might unduly curtail
freedom of assembly; Concluding Comments on Belgium CCPR/C/79/Add 99, para 23, read with
CCPR/C/SR 1707, para 74, disapproving of mandatory prior authorisation for outdoor meetings,
establishing prohibition as the norm instead of recognition of rights; Concluding Comments on
Mongolia CCPR/C/79/Add 7, para 5, finding requirements for prior permission for holding public
meetings and the criteria for refusing permission for such meetings too broad.
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before it would accept at least a general permit system.'" In addition, it would
subject any general ban even on open air assemblies to serious scrutiny. 1 12
The European Commission, on the other hand, apparently found the no-
tification and permit prerequisites for open air public assemblies and
demonstrations, even the geographically limited, short-term general bans of
such assemblies, actually brought before it entirely unproblematic,"' readily
accepting government assurances of public order dangers and sometimes not
seriously exploring the possibilities of less restrictive means."I
It is submitted that the European Commission's approach to prior restraints,
characterised by a wide margin of appreciation granted to states dealing with
the public order issues generally said to be involved,"' is not a good guide for
those intending to adopt a fundamental freedom approach to these issues.
However, a recent decision of the ECHR is more promising, at least with
regard to refusal of permission.116
"[I]n the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public),
the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights of others"
Section 2(2) of the POO expressly provides that the terms "public safety",
"public order (ordre public)", "the protection of public health", and "the pro-
tection of rights and freedoms of others" are "[to be] interpreted in the same
way as under the [ICCPR] as applied to Hong Kong". "[N]ational security" is
given its own definition: "the safeguarding of the territorial integrity and the
independence of the People's Republic of China." Kiss argues that "national
security" means "the protection of territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence [of a state] against foreign force or threats of force","I but Nowak accepts
as sufficient a threat of violent overthrow from within." During the HRC
11 Cf Nowak (n 42 above), p 381: "Although the legal systems of many States distinguish between a
licensing system and a mere notification system and often consider only the latter compatible with
freedom of assembly, it is possible to interpret ordre public so broadly as to permit a general licensing
system".
112 CCPR/C/79/Add 78, para 26, rejecting a wholesale ban on demonstrations in Lebanon in 1997 as
incompatible with the right to freedom of assembly under Art 21.
113 As to permits: Rune Anderson v Sweden (1989) 59 DR 165 (objection to fee for permit granted); F v
Austria (1993) 15 EHRR CD 68; H v Austria (1993) 15 EHRR CD 70; J v Austria (1993) 15 EHRR
CD 74. As to bans: A Association and H v Austria (1984) 36 DR 187 (a contents ban unheld, an
exceptional case); Christians against Racism and Fascism v United Kingdom (1980) 21 DR 138;
Rassemblement Jurassien v Switzerland (1979) 17 DR 93; Rai, Allmond and "Negotiate Now" v United
Kingdom (1995) 81 DR 146; 19 EHRR CD 93; Chappell v United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRLR 510;
Pendragon v United Kingdom [1999] EHRLR 223.
114 Although the availability of alternative sites for the protests sometimes played an important part in
the decisions, eg the availability of Hyde Park as an alternative to Trafalgar Square in Rai, Allmond
and "Negotiate Now" (n 113 above), pp 96, 98.
115 Fenwick and Phillipson (n 35 above), p 641-643.
116 Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria Applications Nos 29221/95 and
29225/95 (2 Oct 2001).
117 Note 67 above, p 297.
118 Nowak (n 42 above), p 3 8 0 .
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discussion of the HKSAR's report, one member of the Hong Kong delegation
explained: "The [CP] had, in reaching his decision [as to assemblies] to take
special account of the declared purpose of the demonstration, particularly if
it advocated separation from China or independence for Tibet.""' But the
ECHR has said, "... the fact that a group of persons calls for autonomy or
even requests session of part of the country's territory ... cannot automati-
cally justify a prohibition of its assemblies".120
As to public safety, Kiss suggests:
"Rights guaranteed by the Covenant may be restricted if their exercise
involves danger to the safety of persons, to their life, bodily integrity, or
health. The need to protect public safety could justify restrictions result-
ing from police rules and security regulations tending to the protection of
the safety of individuals in transportation and vehicular traffic; for con-
sumer protection, for ameliorating labor conditions, etc."1 21
The term "public order (ordre public)"12 2 is more problematic. In Ng Kung
Siu,'23 the Chief Justice concluded that the concept incorporated in the phrase,
read as a whole, though clearly wider than simple law and order, could not be
"precisely defined". It "includes what is necessary for the protection of the
general welfare or for the interests of the collectivity as a whole" and remains
"a function of time, place and circumstances".124 With respect, this formulation,
though owing much to Kiss's analysis repeatedly cited by the Chief Justice, is
defective in that it omits two crucial aspects of that analysis: a concentration
on protecting the "adequate functioning of the public institutions" necessary
in democratic society and an insistence that "... the concept itself reflects the
principle that there are limitations on the state's powers, especially as far as
human rights are concerned ... [and] may itself demand respect for human
rights as an element in the exercise of the public authority".125 Any explana-
tion of ordre public should emphasise that what was envisioned by the drafters
was a democratic, human rights-conscious ordre public, not merely a regimented
and well ordered one.
119 CCPR/C/SR 1804, para 38, per Ms Yau.
120 Stankov (n 116 above), para 97.
121 Ibid., p 298.
122 There must be serious doubt as to the wisdom, if not the lawfulness, of including a foreign term of
uncertain meaning in an HKSAR ordinance that has significant impact on ordinary HKSAR citizens.
123 Note 22 above, pp 137-140, per Li CJ; p 144, per Bokhary PJ.
124 The Chief Justice listed as examples, "prescription for peace and good order; safety; public health;
aesthetic and moral considerations and economic order (consumer protection, etc)", clearly bor-
rowed directly from Kiss (n 67 above), p 30 2 .
125 Note 67 above, p 30 2 .
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As to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, given the breadth
of the other terms, this must surely be confined to the "fundamental" rights
and freedoms of others only.126 But there is as yet no HRC or even ECHR
authority to this effect.
Freedom of Assembly Under the ICCPR and PART III of the P00 127
Obligations / Powers to Facilitate Meetings
Access to appropriate space
The bottom line is that access to public spaces for the purposes of assemblies
remains a matter of executive, public authority and / or police sufferance in the
HKSAR. The power of the Chief Executive to "designate any area as a desig-
nated public area for the purposes of this Part [of the POO]" does not change
that.128 There are currently 16 such "designated public areas" throughout the
HKSAR. None are near politically significant cites in Central or Wanchai.
None are part of a public road.129 Furthermore, the practical advantages of
designation for would-be assemblers are limited. Notice requirements still apply,
although the only type of condition that may be imposed with respect to meet-
ings (not processions) in such areas relates to time,"o and the power to prohibit
proposed assemblies is retained. Thus, though indicating some official recogni-
tion of the space needs of public meetings, as a purported discharge of the positive
obligation to provide access to appropriate space advocated above, the terms
and current implementation of section 10 are radically inadequate.
The recent repeal of numerous by-laws and rules that required written
permission from relevant local government "directors" before a public assem-
bly could be held in or on public space under their general jurisdiction may be
more significant." Again, however, ample powers to deal with undesired
126 David Feldman, "Freedom of Expression," in Harris and Joseph (eds), The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and United Kingdom Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp 391, 412.
Nowak (n 42 above), pp 382-383 asserts a contrary view, listing as illustrations the "rights of passers-
by, as well as those of participants, to personal safety and physical integrity", but then relates these
to public safety.
127 The original Part III was totally replaced by the Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance 1980.
Further substantial amendments were made to the replaced version in 1995 and 1997. For commen-
tary on the pre-19 9 5 versions, see Roda Mushkat, "Peaceful Assembly," in Raymond Wacks (ed),
Human Rights in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1992), p 410. Mushkat also
raised many of the general problems with the POO discussed below.
128 POO, s 10.
129 See POO (Designated Public Areas)(Consolidation) Order (Cap 245F). Designated areas are iden-
tified in a schedule with reference to maps and plans signed by the Secretary for Security and lodged
in the Secretary's office.
130 POO, s 11(2), at least "insofar as the interests of public order are concerned".
131 See Provision of Municipal Services (Reorganization) Ordinance (Cap 552), schedule 3, repealing
the Public Health and Municipal Ordinance (Cap 132), ss 105R-105T. Cf the Country Parks and
Special Areas Regulations (Cap 208A), regs 10, 11 and 12; Airport Authority By-Laws (Cap 483),
s 17( 2 ); Public Cemeteries Regulations (Cap 132(BI)), s 11(1)(c).
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assemblies were retained, for example through general powers to make
rules governing use of facilities and conduct therein as well as specific
obstruction, 32 disorderly behaviour and noise-creating offences, prohibitions
on fixing or distributing bills or placards without the permission of a relevant
official, 33 and, of course, the Poo itself.'3 4
Control of hostile audiences
Section 17B(1) provides that any person "who at any public gathering acts in
a disorderly manner for the purpose of preventing the transaction of the busi-
ness for which the public gathering was called or incites others to do so"
commits an offence. "' This provision, together with other public order pow-
ers in the POO and common law powers relating to breach of the peace,
discussed below, as well as disorderly conduct offences in other legislation, at
least enable the HKSAR police to act to protect peaceful assemblies from
hostile audiences and small numbers of violent participants if they so choose.
Whether these powers are actually used in this way merits further study.
Content restrictions 36
"Procession" is defined in section 2(1) as meaning "a procession organized as
such' 7 for a common purpose, and includes any meeting held in conjunction
with such a procession". Assuming "common purpose" includes purposes of
all kinds including social ones, this definition is content neutral. "[P]ublic
procession" is defined as "any procession in, to or from a public place" and a
public place is "any place to which for the time being the public or any sec-
tion of the public are entitled or permitted to have access, whether on payment
or otherwise ... ". These and other provisions concerning notice procedures
for public processions are also content neutral"' and, again, to that extent
unproblematic.
132 Civil Centres Regulations (Cap 132F), s 12, Pleasure Grounds Regulations (Cap 132BC), s 21.
1 Pleasure Grounds Regulations (Cap 132BC), s 15.
134 See also Public Health and Municipal Services Ordinance (Cap 132), s 137A which provides: "Any
part of a stadium, museum, library or civic center to which from time to time the public has access
... shall, during such time, be deemed to be a public place for the purposes of ... the [POO]" and the
Airport Authority Ordinance (Cap 483), s 44 to like effect.
135 The words "preventing the transaction of the business" betray the public meetings origins of this
provision, but "public gathering" as defined includes processions.
136 See also Part IV, s 26, which penalises statements or conduct at a public gathering intended or
known to be likely, or which the offender ought to have known to be likely, to incite or induce
others to kill or physically injure people, or destroy, damage or deprive others of property. As noted
above, the ICCPR does not protect incitement of imminent violence, perhaps of any violence, but
the merits of criminalising negligent incitement or inducement of violence by others should be
queried when negligent infliction of violence itself is not a crime.
137 Even spontaneous processions require a minimal amount of organisation.
13 Except for funeral processions: see ss 13A(l)(a) and 17(2)(a).
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The same is not true for static meetings. A "meeting" is defined as:
"any gathering or assembly of persons convened or organized for the pur-
pose of the discussion of issues or matters of interest or concern to the
general public or a section thereof, or for the purpose of the expression of
views on such issues or matters ... but does not include any gathering or
assembly of persons convened or organized exclusively -
(a) for social, recreational, cultural, academic, educational, religious or
charitable purposes, or as a conference or seminar bona fide intended
for the discussion of topics of a social, recreational, cultural, academic,
educational, religious, charitable, professional, business or commer-
cial character;
(b) for the purpose of a funeral;
(c) for the purposes of any public body; or
(d) for the purpose of carrying out any duty or exercising any power im-
posed or conferred by any Ordinance."
Meetings initially within this exclusion may subsequently come within
the definition if during the course of the meeting "any person assumes or
attempts to assume control or leadership thereof for any such purpose".
It is submitted that this is not a content neutral definition because it tar-
gets only public interest or political meetings.139 Since "public meetings" are
defined as "any meeting held or to be held in a public place", it follows that
public meetings are also defined with reference to content. If a fundamental
freedom approach is adopted, any additional burdening of such meetings, the
very kind of meeting the drafters of Article 21 were most anxious to protect,
would require very strong justification indeed. Whether the additional bur-
dens imposed by Part III of the POO can be so justified is considered below.o
Prior restraints: banning powers
On first examination the allocation of POO banning powers amongst offi-
cials appears to have been carefully tailored to ensure the assignment of higher
impact powers to officials of higher status (and hence presumably higher po-
litical sensitivity and accountability). Thus, a specific power to prohibit the
139 See Barendt (n 36 above), p 174. Cf Bynum v US 93 F Supp 2d 50; Lederman v US 89 F Supp 2d 29;
2000 US Dist Lexis 4244 where a regulation using the phrase "supporting or opposing a point of
view" was said to apply to all demonstrations in the area irrespective of content. However, the
regulation was struck down as too broad.
140 The definition, added by the Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance 1980, was seen as a positive
reform at the time since it replaced an "all-embracing definition" in the original ordinance, see
Roda Mushkat, "Balancing Freedom of Expression and Public Order in Hong Kong" (1981) 11
HKLJ 62, 73, although Mushkat was well aware of the deficiencies of the definition and denied any
need for a licensing system for meetings at all.
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holding of all or any class of public gatherings, 14 Part III's widest category of
assembly, in all or part of the HKSAR for any period not exceeding three
months is given to the highest ranking official, the Chief Executive in Council,
with very limited possibilities for anything other than political review. 142 The
power to ban specific public meetings and public processions is given to the
Commissioner of Police (CP). The CP's exercise of this power is subject to
relatively independent appeal procedures, themselves in turn subject to judi-
cial review. However, on closer inspection, the correlation between power
and status is illusionary. First, section 51 of the POO provides that the Chief
Executive "may give such directions as he thinks fit with respect to the exer-
cise or performance by the [CP] or any other police officer of the powers,
functions or duties conferred or imposed on him by or under this Ordinance,
either generally or in any particular case". So the Chief Executive could le-
gally direct the CP to prohibit a particular assembly. The section specifically
provides that the CP must comply with such directions. How the Appeal
Board would be expected to deal with decisions by the CP made in obedience
of such directions is a very interesting, but unanswered, question. Secondly,
the CP can use the prohibition powers, alone or in combination with sec-
tions 6(1), 11 and 15 powers, to impose conditions considered below, to
effectively ban all or certain types of assembly activity from a particular area,
at least for a limited period. Thirdly, the power to ban individual assemblies is
not even confined to the Chief Executive and the CP. Section 52 permits the
CP to delegate his powers to prohibit a notified meeting or object to a proces-
sion to "any police officer of the rank of inspector or above". 143
Nor have the banning powers been carefully or narrowly drawn. The Chief
Executive may only exercise the general banning power if "it is necessary for
the prevention of serious disorder", but the judge of that necessity is the Chief
Executive himself. The CP's powers to ban specific assemblies under sections 9
and 14 look relatively circumscribed. For example, the powers cannot be exer-
cised at all within 48 hours of a notified commencement time; all banns must
be in writing and accompanied by reasons; and, most significantly, there is a
relatively independent appeal procedure, presumably on the merits since there
is no other indication of the standard or criteria the Board should apply.144 But
141 Defined in s 2(1) as "a public meeting, a public procession and any other meeting, gathering or
assembly of 10 or more persons in a public place".
142 Meaning the Chief Executive acting after having received the advice of the Executive Council,
though not necessarily in accordance with that advice.
13 Section 17(2)(a), which gives inspectors or above powers to "prevent the holding of public
gatherings", amongst other things, may go even further, but the exact meaning of this provision is
in doubt. See discussion of s 17(2) generally below. Cf the very much narrower English delegation
powers discussed in Richard Card (n 105 above), para 6.93, pp 253-254.
144 Section 44A provides that the Appeal Board must consider and determine any appeal "with the
greatest expedition possible so as to ensure that the appeal is not frustrated by reason of the decision
of the Appeal Board being delayed ... ".
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again, in reality the powers are very wide. First, the section 9 power applies to
"public meetings notified under section 8". As defined, "public meeting" in-
cludes not only open air or public hall meetings open to all the public but
extends also to meetings on enclosed private premises for which admission is
charged, provided "a section of the public" may attend and matters of public
interest are on the agenda. 14' The section 14 power to object to processions
appears to apply to all public processions, notifiable or not and irrespective of
whether they begin or end with a meeting. Secondly, the powers may be exer-
cised if the CP "reasonably considers" that the prohibition or objection is
"necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order
(ordre public) or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others". Although
this terminology is obviously borrowed from the ICCPR, there is no mention of
a "democratic society" as part of the standard to be applied.14 Nor is there any
mention of the degree of threat the various interests, rights or freedoms must be
facing, although it is provided that the CP shall not exercise the powers if he
"reasonably considers" those interests, rights and freedoms "could be met by
imposing conditions". 4 1
Can these broad, ill-drafted, overlapping powers nevertheless be defended
as necessary in a democratic society for the achievement of legitimate aims?
It is submitted that they cannot.
It is submitted that a fundamental freedom approach to freedom of assem-
bly must view general bans on assemblies as the antithesis of a fundamental
freedom of assembly. If acceptable at all, general bans on assemblies must be
rigorously confined to only what is strictly needed. The starting point, and
usually the ending point, should then be that the real dangers presented by
each proposed public assembly should be separately considered. At the very
least, large numbers of manageable assemblies should not be sacrificed in or-
der to make certain of catching a small number of unmanageable ones.
Is there then any credible evidence to show that Hong Kong is, from time to
time, so vulnerable, unstable and uncontrollable a society that a general ban on
14 In the context of meetings, "public place" is further defined to include "any place which is or will
be, on the occasion and for the purposes of such a meeting, a public place". The meaning of this
phrase becomes more and more obscure upon examination, but for present purposes it is sufficient
to note that it was certainly intended to extend "public place" even further beyond any ordinary
usage of the term and to extend the net of "public meeting" as far as possible without losing sight of
the "public" element altogether.
146 An omission noticed with concern by at least one member of the HRC during the discussion of the
HKSAR report, CCPR/C/SR1804, para 51, per Lord Colville.
147 What if the CP unreasonably considers that conditions are enough, or, more problematically, un-
reasonably considers that conditions are not enough? The provision does not really impose an
objective reasonableness standard. See also ss 8(2) and 13A(2) in the same style. What is needed is
an obligation on the CP to use conditions rather than banning, or accept shorter notice, unless the
CP has reasonable grounds for believing that conditions alone or the shorter notice period will not
be sufficient to protect the relevant legitimate object, using as always the standard of a democratic
society.
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all or some gatherings would sometimes be necessary for the prevention of serious
disorder here? Perhaps, but then the question must be asked whether, applying
the standard of a democratic society, the section 17E power is proportional to
that need. As written, section 17E would permit the banning of all gatherings of
any kind of 10 or more people even in enclosed public places such as restaurants,
village halls or shopping malls. It is noteworthy that the scope of this power far
exceeds any non-emergency banning powers applicable to London148 or New
York City.'49 Of course, that by itself proves nothing, but it should give pause for
thought. Giving full weight to the disturbances of the 1960s and early 1970s, and
remembering that the section 17E power does not purport to be an emergency or
wartime power,s 0 it is submitted that no person, applying a fundamental freedom
approach, could ever find a banning power of such all-encompassing breadth to
be necessary in a democratic society. Certainly, the HRC would not find it so.
Of course, it may be possible to adduce credible evidence that a much nar-
rower banning power, perhaps confined to open air assemblies of significant size
or within a narrow geographical area, is necessary for the occasional prevention
of serious disorder in Hong Kong and, applying the standards of a democratic
society, is proportional to that need.' But that would be another ordinance.
As to the various powers to prohibit specific public processions, the starting
point must be that any such power facilitates illegitimate content based or sim-
ply over-cautious suppression of assembly activity. However, public processions
in particular can create exceptionally difficult traffic control and other public
order problems, so that a narrow prohibition power probably could be shown to
be necessary for the protection of one or more legitimate objectives in Hong
Kong. As to proportionality, it is submitted that if the CP's section 14 power to
object to processions stood alone, given the real safeguards imposed, the power
would be very close to acceptable. But the grounds upon which the power can
be exercised remain wide and vague and must be narrowed. At the very least,
148 Public Order Act 1986, s 13, confined to processions; s 14A, confined to open air trespassory
assemblies; City of London Police Act 1839, s 52; and Metropolitan Police Act 1839, s 52, giving
the relevant commissioners extensive powers to issue directives to prevent obstruction and main-
tain the peace in public streets; and powers relating to specific sites such as the Trafagar Square
Regulations 1952 (1952 SI 776). That said, bans on processions actually imposed under these pro-
visions in the last 20 years have far exceeded anything done by the Hong Kong police, for example
bans on processions covering many square miles of London. See the extensive discussion in Richard
Card (n 105 above), Ch 6.
149 The author was unable to find any general banning power relating to public forums, although per-
mits for specific processions or parades may be refused, in particular for congested business streets
between 9.00 am and 6.00 pm, see NYC Administrative Code, s 10-110. As to attempts to control
assembly activities at specific public sites such as the spaces in front of City Hall, see Housing Works
Inc v Howard Safir Commissioner of New York City Police Department, the City of New York and Rudolph
Giuliani, Mayor of City of New York 10 1 F Supp 2d 163.
150 The POO also contains provisions relating to the imposition of curfews and restricted areas. A
pragmatist looking at the HKSAR's unique circumstances might argue it is better for the HKSAR to
rely on the POO than to enact specific emergency powers legislation, but that is a topic for another
article.
151 The European Commission accepted the English powers. See cases cited in n 113 above.
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the power should be confined to processions similar to those that now require
notification and the standard restated as something like "necessary in a demo-
cratic society for the prevention of serious threats to national security, public
safety, public order or the fundamental rights or freedoms of others". The CP's
discretion should be further circumscribed by binding directives incorporating
the priority to be given to the exercise of the fundamental freedom of assembly,
the use of the power as a last resort, a commitment to content neutrality' and
the Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben" principle. The Chief Executive's power to
direct the CP's actions in this and other matters under the POO should be
removed and the power of the CP to delegate the banning power should be
restricted to higher ranking officers."'
As to the section 9 power relating to public meetings, it is submitted that
the content bias and wide range of the definition of "public meetings" are
fatal. Defence of the content bias in the power would require credible evidence:
1 that public meetings on matters of public interest in the HKSAR
typically, or at least fairly often, cause public order or public safety
problems that are different in kind, magnitude or intensity to those
caused by recreational, religious, sporting or cultural gatherings of com-
parable size and location; and
2 that such different problems cannot be handled by the reasonable de-
ployment of public resources, including public safety resources, or the
imposition of permissible conditions or other arrangements.
Even if this could be done with respect to open air meetings in true public
spaces, defence of the present power would require the government to prove its
case with respect to public interest meetings held in enclosed premises or on
private premises with the consent of the owner as well. The enormity of this
task only becomes clear when the full implications of a banning power such as
this, but without the public interest bias, are carefully considered.5 4 Surely such
a threat to our fundamental freedom of assembly would be intolerable.
Is there any circumstance in a democratic society in general or the HKSAR
in particular that could ever make such a power necessary? Perhaps a content
neutral power55 confined to open air assemblies on public / quasi-public land,
at least above a certain size, could be defended as necessary in a democratic
152 Subject to standard ICCPR exceptions, see previous discussion.
153 No particular rank is suggested here, but certainly the rank of inspector, which is one of the points
of entry into the force in Hong Kong, is too low.
14 See Barendt (n 36 above), p 176.
155 Except, perhaps, for powers to ban open air assemblies in support of direct and immediate national
security issues or imminent violence, although the ordinary criminal law could be applied to the
latter.
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society for a legitimate purpose'56 - but it is difficult to see how even the
distinctive characteristics of the HKSAR could justify anything more.
Prior restraints: notice prerequisites
Section 7(1) provides that:
"Subject to this Ordinance, a public meeting may take place if, but only if,
(a) the [CP] is notified under section 8 of the intention to hold the
meeting; and
(b) the holding of the meeting is not prohibited by the [CP] under
section 9."
Section 13 provides that:
"a public procession may take place if, but only if -
(a) the [CP] is notified under section 13A of the intention to hold the
procession;
(b) the [CP] has notified under section 14(4) the person that he has no
objection to the procession taking place or is taken to have issued a
notice of no objection [because the time limit for this has passed] ... ."
These provisions mean exactly what they say. Meetings or processions that
ought to have been notified, but were not, are actually unlawful. Organisation
of or participation in such assemblies is a serious criminal offence. In this way,
the fundamental freedom of assembly is stood on its head. It is no longer a
freedom or a right, oftentimes a crime, and at best a privilege for which would-
be assemblers must seek permission. The HKSAR Government has consistently
denied that either of these notice processes amounts to a licensing or permit
system. But, irrespective of the terminologym' used, the bottom line is that a
relevant public meeting or procession will be unlawful unless proper notice
has been given and the CP has not prohibited or objected to that meeting or
procession. The absence of any need for a piece of paper called a licence, per-
mit or notice of no objection does not change that.
156 It would be necessary to ensure that such a power was not used, by means of a general policy of
denial of permission, to institute a general ban with respect to a specific area, something that ap-
pears to have been done in early 2002 with respect to the open area outside the Central Government
Offices, see citations in n 4 above. General bans should be imposed under specific statutory banning
powers only, publicly acknowledged and defended as such.
157 The differences in format of these two provisions is confusing and misleading. It suggests a more
liberal regime for meetings, but in practice, at least with respect to meetings that require notification,
this is not really so since neither meetings nor processions may lawfully take place before the noti-
fied time and the CP may prohibit / object to either at any time up until, but not after, 48 hours
before the notified time and on the same grounds. Neither meetings nor processions may be adver-
tised until 24 hours after notice has been given.
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Can these procedures nevertheless be defended as necessary in a demo-
cratic society for achieving a legitimate objective? It is submitted that they
cannot. It is true that the notice prerequisites do not apply to public meetings
of less that 50 persons anywhere, or 500 persons if on private premises, or any
number of people in certain educational establishments with the consent of
relevant authorities,158 nor to public processions of not more than 30 people
or which do not take place on a public highway or thoroughfare or in a public
park.159 It is also true that, although the general notice period is "not later
than 11 a.m. on the same day of the week in the preceding week as the day on
which the [public meeting or procession] is intended to be held",160 the CP
"may, and shall in any case where he is reasonably satisfied that earlier notice
could not have been given, accept shorter notice ... "..161 Also, the CP is re-
quired to give written reasons for any decision not to accept shorter notice,
thus facilitating judicial review so that, apart from the fact that a refusal to
accept shorter notice is not explicitly appealable to the Appeal Board (it
should be), all appears fairly moderate and reasonable.
But, as previously shown, the HRC opposes general permit requirements
for public assemblies. Notwithstanding the exemptions discussed above, that
is what these provisions essentially are. Even for the ECHR, the bottom line
is that mere participation in a peaceful assembly should not be penalised.
These provisions make such participation prima facie unlawful. And, of course,
the notice requirement for public meetings is open to the same objections
arising from the content bias and extraordinary breadth of the term "public
meeting" as defined as the CP's section 7 banning power.
It might be possible to prove that time-flexible notice requirements for
processions of more than, say, 30 persons and meetings of more than, say, 50
persons,"z to be held in public parks, on public highways or other open air
public places within a high density modem city are necessary in a democratic
society and proportional to that need, so as to enable content neutral man-
agement of scarce space resources, traffic regulation and preparations for any
158 POO, s 7(2).
159 POO, s 13(2). The CP also has an unqualified discretion to exempt any public procession "of a
nature or description" of the CP's choice. With respect, such an uncontrolled discretion, inviting
content bias, cannot be consistent with a fundamental freedoms approach.
160 POO, ss 8(1), 13A(1)(b), but funeral processions only require 24 hours notice, s 13A(1)(a).
161 POO, ss 8(2), 13A(2). As to the curious use of "reasonably satisfied", see n 147 above. In practice,
the commissioner has frequently accepted very short notice, and even no notice at all, at least to the
extent of not prosecuting offenders.
162 In this context, the ICCPR cannot be read as stipulating minimum numbers below which notice or
permits should not be required, but governments must be able to justify any numbers they do choose.
If it is not possible to show that there is good reason for a cut off point at 30 rather than 40, for
example, then a fundamental freedom approach would require the least intrusive option to be chosen.
The final choice will, however, always be arbitrary to some degree. There are also very real problems
surrounding the application of numerical limits in particular cases where numbers may fluctuate or
be much larger than predicted. These problems with numbers are an additional reason for avoiding
criminal sanctions for failing to notify.
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anticipated public order problems. But unnotified assemblies should be
neither unlawful nor subject to dispersal because of the failure to notify alone.
Nor should participants in unnotified assemblies be harassed with criminal
charges such as obstruction, breach of the peace or other petty offences in
circumstances where participants in a notified assembly would have been left
alone.163
Prior restraints: powers to impose conditions
At first sight, and subject as always to the indefensible content biased and
overly broad definition of "public meeting", sections 11 and 15, which grant
the CP the power to impose, and amend, such conditions with respect to
notified public meetings and public processions respectively as "he reason-
ably considers ... necessary in the interests of national security or public safety,
public order (ordre public) or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others" appear reasonable, especially as the exercise of their powers is also
subject to appeal to the Appeal Board.
There is also section 6(1), which provides that if the CP "reasonably con-
siders it to be necessary" for any of the usual reasons, he has the power "in such
manner as [the CP] thinks fit" to "control and direct the conduct of all public
gatherings and specify the route by which, and the time at which, any public
procession may pass". 16 There is no mention of a right of appeal here and "pub-
lic gathering" reaches far beyond public meetings and processions. Apparently,
the sections 11 and 15 powers are subject to the section 6(1) power, which may
or may not be confined to the giving of general directions.'
It is submitted that a grant of power to the CP to impose one or more of a
stipulated range of possible types of conditions16 1 on specific open air proces-
sions or meetings where the CP reasonably considers it necessary to do so for
a legitimate purpose, always applying the standard of a democratic society,
could be justified, the more so where the exercise of that power is subject to
independent appeal. A section 6(1) style power, specifically limited to traffic
control or other specified aspects of open air assemblies generally, might also
be accepted as necessary. But given the breadth of the definition of "public
163 The important word here is "harassed". It may be legitimate to give extra leeway to properly notified
assemblies as an incentive to notify.
164 Section 6(1). The CP must first reasonably consider such action necessary in the interests of na-
tional security, etc.
165 Again, general orders like these should be readily available to the public. Section 52, the delegation
section, refers to s 6(a)(b) and (c), which do not exist. If s 6(a) could be interpreted to mean s 6(1),
the power can be delegated to a chief superintendent or above.
166 The need for a stipulated range of legitimate types of conditions is well demonstrated by the recent
controversial break-up of an "abode seekers" demonstration, perhaps on the ground of breach of a
probably unlawful condition that no illegal "over stayers" be permitted to participate, see Ng Kang-
chung and Sophia Chu, "Chater Garden crackdown may have been unlawful", SCMP, 28 Apr2002
, p 2.
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gathering" and the vagueness of "control and direct", the present section 6
(1) power can not be justified. The question whether this power should be
delegable to inspectors should also be reconsidered. 167
Regulation of meetings, processions and gatherings in progress
Sections 11(1) and 15(1) of the POO require the organisers of public as-
semblies covered by the notice prerequisites, or their nominated deputies,
to be present throughout. They declare that "[g]ood order and public safety
shall be maintained" and amplification devices surrendered to the police if
so requested.'6' Each of these deserves a comment on its own, but for rea-
sons of space they will not be discussed here.
As to powers, section 17(1) gives any police officer the power to prevent,
stop or disperse public meetings or processions that ought to have been notified
but have not been, or which are contravening or have contravened the condi-
tions imposed under sections 11 or 15. Obviously, if that part of the notification
process that purports to make the peaceful, but unnotified, exercise of the fun-
damental freedom of assembly unlawful is removed, this power must also be
removed. It is submitted that it is in any case objectionable and unwise that the
decision to prevent, stop or disperse a peaceful exercise of the fundamental
freedom of assembly can, even in theory, be made by a police constable.16'
Section 17(2) gives inspectors or above powers "... to prevent, stop, dis-
perse or vary the place or route of any public gathering .. .", 17o or "stop and
disperse ... any meeting convened or held in any premises or place which is
not a public place or any gathering or procession whatsoever or wheresoever
... "171 if the inspector "reasonably believes that the [relevant gathering] is
likely to cause or lead to a breach of the peace". 172 It is not clear whether
these powers are intended to be in addition to or to replace common law and
statutory powers, said to extend to all police officers, to interfere at any time
to do what is necessary to prevent or stop a breach of the peace.17 1 If the
former, the purported safeguards in the legislation are illusory, since the broader
167 The comment at n 169 below is apt.
168 As to amplification devices, see also s 6(2).
169 See General Comment on Mauritius, CCPR/C/SR. 1477, para 53, per Mr Bhagwati: "In paragraph 1.3
under the section on article 21 the report stated that a police officer had the power to interrupt a
public gathering if he believed that the continuance of the gathering was prejudicial to public safety or
public order. In such cases it was necessary to specify the rank of police officer since it would be wrong
to give that power to all police officers."
170 Except public gatherings exclusively for religious purposes.
171 Including public gatherings exclusively for religious purposes.
172 There are also supplementary provisions authorising the giving of orders necessary or expedient for
the purposes of s 17(1) and (2), including the use of force, entry into premises [for meetings] and
closing access to public places.
173 Section 17G provides that Part III is "in addition to and not in derogation of" any ordinance, but
says nothing about the common law. As to common law powers to disperse an assembly on the
grounds of a feared breach of the peace, see Richard Card (n 104 above), para 2.17, pp 35-37;
Marston and Tain (n 105 above), pp 23-24.
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and looser common law powers contain none of them."' It would also mean
that a person who disobeyed an inspector acting under this power would be
liable to a much more severe penalty than a person who disobeyed a sergeant
or constable in similar circumstances."' If the latter, prima facie the alterna-
tive more consistent with a fundamental freedom approach, the breadth of
the powers, extending to any gathering of any number of persons in any place
wheresoever, would mean the powers of police officers below the rank of in-
spector to deal with low-level small group disorder totally unconnected with
the expressive freedoms would be far more limited than commonly believed.
Neither result makes good sense in respect of criminal law, public order or
freedom of assembly.
Another source of difficulty is the incorporation of "breach of the peace"
into the threshold standard. As to the meaning of "breach of the peace", the
ECHR has said that English case law 76 has "sufficiently established" that a
breach of the peace is "committed only when an individual causes harm, or
appears likely to cause harm, to persons or property or acts in a manner the
natural consequence of which would be to provoke others to violence"."
That definition, though arguably confusing "breach of the peace" as a state of
disorder with a statement of responsibility for that disorder, and not entirely
in accord with the Howell"' definition, has been quoted without disapproval
by an English Divisional Court in Redmond-Bate. 79 Applied to "breach of the
peace" as a state of disorder, it suggests that a breach of the peace occurs
whenever harm is done or appears likely to be done by someone to some
other person or their property (in their presence). With respect, whilst a real
,possibility of harm being done by one person to another is a sufficient reason
for the law to intervene between them, it is surely not a sufficient reason for
preventing, stopping, dispersing or even rerouting an otherwise peaceful ex-
ercise of a fundamental freedom of assembly by other persons. Yet that is what
section 17(2) would allow, at least in theory. It is submitted that a fundamen-
tal freedom approach would require the threshold for this very invasive power
to be raised to something more like "actual or serious risk of significant /
serious public disorder"." A fundamental freedom approach would also
174 For discussion of the difficulties this raises in England, see Therese Murphy (n 40 above), pp 458-
463.
17 As to penalties for breach of the peace and obstruction in Hong Kong, see Magistrates Ordinance
(Cap 227), s 61; Offences Against the Person Ordinance (Cap 212), s 41; and n 182 below.
176 The court relied on R v Howell [1982] 1 QB 416; Percy v DPP [1995] 1 WLR 1382; Nicol and
Selvanayagam v DPP [1996] JPR 155; [1996] Crim LR 318 (D Ct), since followed in later decisions.
See n 179 below.
177 Steel v United Kingdom (1998) 28 EHRR 603, paras 25-28, 55.
178 [198113 All ER 383.
179 Redmond-Bate v DPP [2000] HRLR 249, p 255. See also Lesley Edward Bibby v The Chief Constable of
Essex Police (2000) 164 JP 297; 2000 WL 345165.
180 Of course, individuals could always be arrested for their own offences.
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require that the lawful exercise of the power be explicitly subject to the
Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben" principle. This would be in keeping with re-
cent English decisions that have held that police officers who reasonably
apprehend an imminent breach of the peace may only lawfully act against a
person who would be responsible for that breach of the peace and, most sig-
nificantly in this context, that a person who was properly exercising their
freedom of assembly, demonstration or free speech would never be respon-
sible for the unlawful and unreasonable violence that conduct might arouse
in others."' The only qualification would be where the inspector reasonably
believed significant / serious public disorder could not (reasonably) be pre-
vented by any other means.
Enforcement and subsequent punishment
Sections 17A and 17E(2) create numerous offences punishing every conceiv-
able form of disobedience by individuals to every form of official order possible
under Part III, including conditions imposed under sections 6, 11 and 15 and
orders given under section 17(3) for the purpose of carrying out the prevention,
stoppage and dispersal powers in section 17(1)(2). Section 17A(1)(d) cre-
ates various advertising offences. Section 17B(2) creates a very widely drawn
offence of individual misconduct in a public place and section 17C creates an
offence of having an offensive weapon "at any public meeting or on the occa-
sion of any public procession". All are in addition to other obstruction and
disorderly behaviour offences.'82 Maximum sentences are typically 12 months,
towards the maximum for obstruction offences."
But it is the offence of unauthorised assembly that demands special scru-
tiny here.'
181 Nicol and Sevanayagam v DPP (n 176 above); Redmond-Bate v DPP (n 179 above); Bibby v Chief
Constable of Essex Police (n 179 above); and see Richard Card (n 105 above), paras 2.21-2.23,
pp 39-43.
182 See Therese Murphy (n 40 above), pp 458-461 as to the consequences of the concurrent existence
of these offences in England as well.
183 The general obstruction offences in other ordinances typically have maximum sentences of six
months' imprisonment, eg Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap 373), s 62; ICAC Ordinance (Cap 204),
s 13A; Immigration Service Ordinance (Cap 331), s 19; Police Force Ordinance (Cap 232), s 93
(assaulting / resisting police officer in the execution of his duty); Summary Offences Ordinance
(Cap 228), s 23 (resisting / obstructing public officers including police officers). But cf Offences
Against the Person Ordinance (Cap 212), s 36, re assaulting, resisting or wilfully obstructing a
police officer in the due execution of his duty, maximum two years' imprisonment. The maximum
sentence for the s 17C offensive weapons offence is two years. Cf POO, s 33 ("Any person who ...
has with him in any public place any offensive weapon", mandatory custodial sentences for defen-
dants 14 years and over for a maximum of three years); POO, s 32 (carries or has in his possession in
an area under curfew, maximum three years); and Summary Proceedings Ordinance (Cap 228), s 17
(possession of offensive weapon with intent to use the same for any unlawful purpose, fine or maxi-
mum two years).
184 The offence dates from the original ordinance. The term "unauthorised assembly" replaced "unlaw-
ful assembly" and the element of "knowingly" was added in 1980.
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Section 17A states:
"(2) Where -
(a) any public meeting or public procession takes place in contravention
of section 7 or 13;
(b) 3 or more persons taking part in or forming part of [any public
gathering] refuse or wilfully neglect to obey an order given or issued
under section 6; or
(c) 3 or more persons taking part in or forming part of [any gathering] refuse
or wilfully neglect to obey an order given or issued under section 17(3),
the [relevant type of assembly] ... shall be an unauthorized assembly.
(3) Where any [type of assembly] ... is an unauthorized assembly by virtue
of section (2) -
(a) every person who, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse,
knowingly takes or continues to take part in or forms or continues to
form part of any such authorized assembly; and
(b) every person who -
(i) holds, convenes, organizes, forms or collects, or assists or is con-
cerned in the holding etc of any public meeting or procession
referred to in subsection 2(a); or
(ii) continues or attempts to continue to hold or conduct, or to di-
rect otherwise than for the purpose of securing obedience to an
order given or issued under section 6 or 17(3), [any gathering
referred to in subsection (2)(b) or (2)(c)],
after the same has become an unauthorized assembly as aforesaid, shall be
guilty of an offence and shall be liable -
(i) [on indictment to imprisonment for five years]
(ii) [on summary conviction to a fine of HK$5,000 and imprison-
ment for three years]."
Participants in an unauthorised assembly who did not know that proper
notice had not been given, conditions violated or orders disobeyed, even if
only because they had given no thought to these things or did not care
whether they had occurred or not, could not be guilty of this offence. But if
they did know one of these things, any willing participant would be guilty
of this offence and liable to penalties of three or five years' imprisonment
even if they did nothing else, and even if neither they nor other partici-
pants presented any kind of threat to the public peace. With respect, no
fundamental freedom approach could find even the possibility of the impo-
sition of such severe penalties on persons exercising their freedom of peaceful
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assembly, or assisting others to do so, necessary in a democratic society for any
legitimate purpose, failure to comply with notice requirements or other disobe-
dience not withstanding. Certainly, the actual imposition of penalties anything
like these could never be accepted as proportionate."' The disparity between
the penalties available for these offences and public order / obedience offences
in other legislation would be an additional negative factor."8
The Secretary for Security and the Secretary for Justice both defended
even the five years maximum penalty. " They argued that organisers of and
participants in peaceful demonstrations had not been and never would be
sentenced to anything like five years' imprisonment; a severe maximum sen-
tence may serve as a useful deterrent; higher maximum sentences are required
where groups rather than individuals are involved; and a severe sentence may
be merited in the worst possible cases. The first of these reasons is an
acknowledgement that such a penalty would never be justified with respect
to orderly assemblies - but these are the only kinds of assemblies the offence
really targets. Individual or collective conduct that is not peaceful or orderly
is covered by other offences such as disorderly conduct, unlawful assembly
and riot. The consequence is an offence that is either truly draconian or openly
not enforced. As to the second reason, deterrence only works if the public
believes the law will be enforced. In any case, it is widely accepted that deter-
rence must be subordinated to proportionality, both cardinal and ordinal, lest
it be permitted to prove too much and lest even petty crimes be punished by
execution.' As to the third reason, it is true that the communal character of
assemblies is the source of both their greatest value and their greatest threat.
But the threat posed by a peaceful assembly, even a very large peaceful
assembly, is very different from the threat posed by violent groups. A funda-
mental freedom approach to freedom of assembly would require both the law
and decision makers to keep that distinction in the forefront. As to the worst
possible case, the two Secretaries put forward two examples: an organiser who
(secretly) assembled a large crowd in the confined space of Lan Kwai Fong on
a wet slippery Saturday night to protest against laws relating to "rave parties";
and groups supporting and groups opposing the POO, each with strong feelings,
185 Cf Ezelin 14 EHRR 362 in which the ECHR found the sanction of a professional reprimand unac-
ceptable where the conduct objected to did not go beyond participation in a peaceful assembly. The
European Commission and HRC cases only involved fines. The periods of detention or imprison-
ment in the activist cases in Steele were short and controversial.
186 See nn 174 and 182 above. Three years is the maximum sentence for a wide range of offences,
including assault occasioning actual bodily harm and wounding: OAPO, ss 39, 19 respectively. Five
years is the maximum sentence for banking, financial and company fraud and consensual sexual
offences.
187 Legislative Council Minutes No 13 (n 3 above), pp 2165-2168, 2177-2178.
188 See Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 1999),
pp 20-21 and sources cited therein.
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confronting each other somewhere in the HKSAR. People were hurt or killed
in each case. Suppose such consequences could have been avoided had the
organiser and rival groups notified the CP, as required, or obeyed the instruc-
tions of police officers at the scene. Shouldn't they be liable for the full
consequences of their wrongs? Wouldn't a fine alone be inadequate? Perhaps.
But the first question should not be answered in the context of a disobedi-
ence offence. It should be answered in the context of a discussion of the merits
of punishing people for the reckless endangerment of the lives, safety, or
property of others, or the reckless endangerment of the public peace or the
reckless causing of death,' injury, destruction of property or breach of the
public peace, and the relationship of such offences to our existing reckless-
ness rules. And, of course, the second question can easily be answered in the
affirmative without endorsing a maximum sentence of five years'
imprisonment, or even three.
Conclusion
The POO is all about the maintenance of control over and order in a soci-
ety by a government, not the facilitation of public participation in
governance or the free expression of the views and characteristics of a
society's communities. It was adopted at a time when the Mainland was in
the throws of the Cultural Revolution and public participation in the gov-
ernance of Hong Kong threatened the colonial order as well as temporary
order on the streets, and it has retained its principal characteristics since
that birth. Even Governor Patten's amendments left a piece of legislation
far more intrusive upon and circumscribing of the freedoms of public pro-
cession and public and private assembly than anything English governments
or courts have thought necessary (or politically acceptable) in order to
maintain the peace in their own country, even in their most populous city.
With respect, the POO and its premises belong to Hong Kong's history.
The HKSAR has a new set of premises and needs a new public order law to
match, one that starts and ends and is consistent with a fundamental free-
dom approach as demanded by the Basic Law. We might then have a law,
perhaps called something like a Freedom of Assembly law, which begins
with statements of principle and includes express acknowledgement of the
obligation of the police to provide reasonable protection for peaceful pro-
cessions and assemblies and of the state to provide adequate access to public
spaces, always on the basis of strict content neutrality. There might follow
189 Causing death by dangerous driving, punishable on indictment by imprisonment for five years,
otherwise by imprisonment for two years: Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap 374), s 36. See also OAPO,
ss 26, 27; Mass Transit Railway Ordinance (Cap 556), s 30; Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200), ss 60, 63;
and common law manslaughter.
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a limited number of tightly drawn restrictions, such as notification proce-
dures for public processions and open air assemblies above a certain size,
police powers to negotiate and if necessary impose conditions strictly for
the purposes of traffic, public safety and public order control, very circum-
scribed banning powers in times of serious social disorder, and appeal
procedures. There would also be facilitating provisions, perhaps expressly
providing that participants in public processions and open air assemblies
that comply with relevant notification procedures and conditions cannot
be arrested for or charged with obstruction."' Penalties for not observing
notification procedures, if any, would be small and comparable to those in
other jurisdictions. Penalties for other forms of non-violent disobedience,
obstruction or disorderliness would also be kept low, certainly no higher
than those imposed for similar non-violent conduct outside public proces-
sions or public meetings. Provisions in other legislation, for example
legislation relating to traffic, the police, summary offences and specific public
areas, would all be brought into line.
In addition, every effort would be made to make the relevant legal provi-
sions simple, straightforward and accessible, so that lay people seeking to
organise public activities could easily find and understand their legal rights,
obligations and liabilities. The present law is unnecessarily complex, verbose
and difficult to understand.
Then it would be the turn of residents, the CP and subordinates to make
use of and to implement the law, again using a fundamental freedom approach,
and, if necessary, for the executive, the Legislative Council and the courts to
play their parts to ensure this is done. It is to the credit of post-1995 CPs in
particular, and the police in general, that, at least in the short term, most of
the scenes we could then expect to see on HKSAR streets and in the parks
and other public places might not be radically different from those we see
now. But in law and in political reality there would be an enormous difference,
because the freedom of assembly that those within the HKSAR now enjoy
still largely as a matter of grace would then be enjoyed, both in law and in
practice, as a matter of fundamental right.
190 See, for example, the Peaceful Assembly Act 1992, Queensland, Australia.
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